Mineral Warfare: The Dark Side of Technology and International Mediation by Basnyat, Priyanka
The University of San Francisco
USF Scholarship: a digital repository @ Gleeson Library |
Geschke Center
Master's Theses Theses, Dissertations, Capstones and Projects
Spring 5-18-2018
Mineral Warfare: The Dark Side of Technology and
International Mediation
Priyanka Basnyat
pbasnyat@dons.usfca.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.usfca.edu/thes
Part of the African Studies Commons, International Relations Commons, Natural Resource
Economics Commons, Natural Resources Law Commons, and the Natural Resources Management
and Policy Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, Capstones and Projects at USF Scholarship: a digital repository @
Gleeson Library | Geschke Center. It has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of USF Scholarship: a digital
repository @ Gleeson Library | Geschke Center. For more information, please contact repository@usfca.edu.
Recommended Citation
Basnyat, Priyanka, "Mineral Warfare: The Dark Side of Technology and International Mediation" (2018). Master's Theses. 1082.
https://repository.usfca.edu/thes/1082
 Mineral Warfare: 
The Dark Side of Technology and International Mediation 
 
 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree 
 
 
 
MASTER OF ARTS 
in 
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 
 
 
 
By Priyanka Basnyat 
May 26, 2018 
 
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO 
 
 
Under the guidance and approval of the committee, and approval by all the members, this thesis 
project has been accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree. 
 
 
 
 
APPROVED: 
 
 
 
 
Adviser        Date 
 
 
 
______________________________________            _____________________ 
 
 
 
Academic Director        Date 
 
 
 
______________________________________            ______________________  
 1 
Priyanka Basnyat 
MASTER OF ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL STUDIES | SENIOR THESIS 
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO 
 
 
  
Source: http://rethinkingprosperity.org/cell-phones-catalyze-corruption-in-the-congo/ 
 2 
Abstract 
 
 Conflict surrounding the extraction and trade of natural resources is not an uncommon 
phenomenon. Especially in the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which has 
historically suffered from the negative impacts of the resource curse since their mineral wealth 
was first discovered by their Colonial administrators. The importance of Congo’s minerals has 
fluctuated over the years but has peaked during recent times, as their use in technological 
advancements are becoming more vital. The global demand for these mineral ores have sky 
rocketed and consequentially, the largely informal trade has benefitted certain rebel groups, 
playing a pivotal role in the ongoing violence of Africa’s War. There have been many strategies 
employed to break the tie between minerals and armed conflict in the DRC, yet violence is still 
prevalent.  
Despite the heightened media attention on the region, the development and enforcement 
of new international regulations and the creation of industry-led initiatives to tackle the problem, 
this issue continues to persist. This thesis attempts to understand why this is. It argues that the 
dominant Western narrative on these minerals and its links to the ongoing violence is limited, as 
it neglects the historical context of the onset of the fighting, as well as the voice of local miners 
and grassroots organisations in formalisation efforts. I argue that this simplistic account and 
understanding of the conflict, has impeded current efforts as it overlooks and fails to solve the 
fundamental and underlying causes of the conflict. Ultimately, I trace the development of 
Congo’s mineral sector and analyse case comparisons of the various legal mechanisms, initiatives 
and schemes created in response to the growing demand for the conflict minerals, suggesting that 
a more holistic and inclusionary bottom-up approach is required. 
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Figure 1: Regional Map of the DRC and its surrounding countries (Google Maps) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Political Map of DRC and its provinces (Ezilon) 
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Figure 3: Map of 3TG Mining Sites in DRC (Snapshot taken from IPIS Interactive Map) 
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Introduction 
The struggle for access and control of natural resources has often played a large role in 
the nature of armed violence since colonial times. An abundance of the resources is problematic, 
especially in regions with weak institutional capacity, as it allows groups to compete for control 
of them and then reap the rewards. The likelihood of resources leading to conflict is dependent 
on whether extraction is labour intensive or capital intensive, as Dube and Vargas note, “the price 
of natural resources (which are capital intensive) are positively related to conflict: when the price 
rises, conflict rises”1 according to the regions that produce more natural resources. The 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) represents a situation where the labour-intensive 
extraction of its precious metal ores, has been routinely manipulated by stronger parties in the 
region for personal agendas. Without proper control over the sector, struggles over resource 
governance have inadvertently contributed to and maintained a level of violence during the Great 
Congo Wars. 
 In the case of the Congo, it is an extremely mineral rich state, with supplies of diamonds, 
zinc, copper, cobalt and coltan. These precious metals in theory should give the Democratic 
Republic of Congo a comparative advantage over other nations as they are relatively easy and 
cheap to source, yet the revenue from the mineral trade rarely benefits the local population. The 
‘Enough Project,’ an American NGO in 2009, popularized the plight of these Congolese miners2 
and soon their campaign caught worldwide attention. In order to combat the stories of continuing 
instability and injustices facing the Congo that the increased attention brought, there have been 
many international, regional and local efforts established. Nevertheless, despite all these new 
legal mechanisms and supply chain monitoring schemes developed, the problem continues to 
                                                 
1 Dube, O. and Vargas, J. (2013). Commodity Price Shocks and Civil Conflict: Evidence from 
Colombia. Pp.2-3 
2 The Enough Project. (2017). Raise Hope For Congo - The Enough Project. 
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persist. This thesis seeks to evaluate why current efforts to improve resource governance in the 
Congo have failed, as well as illuminate what these strategies have frequently missed. 
For the past two decades, conflict and armed struggles have plagued the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, which has facilitated an endless cycle of poverty and violence on the region. 
Currently there are over 70 armed groups remaining active and the situation is highly complex. 
For a country that has a history of unstable governance, corruption and ethnic hostilities 
stemming from its colonial legacy and maintained by its successive leadership, this fragmentation 
of armed groups is to be expected. Without any legal or accountability mechanisms, the 
abundance of natural resources has attracted and financed many local and regional armed groups 
into prolonging the conflict. The Eastern Congolese economy is highly dependent on the mineral 
trade, with the sector contributing to around a fifth of the country’s GDP3. Tin, Tungsten, and 
Tantalum Ores and gold (3TGs) are mined across the region and are routinely sold and smuggled 
through other countries to be processed into valuable metals. Coltan (the raw form of tantalum) 
in today’s society is a highly-valued mineral, primarily due to its use in many modern-day 
electronics. The demand for the mineral has seen unprecedented growth in the last few decades, 
and with Congolese armed groups controlling some of these mines, along with other factors has 
perpetuated an unstable climate for development in the DRC.  
In 2009, a movement initiated by the influential NGO the Enough project, garnered huge 
international attention and influenced many advocates to take up the cause. Advocates focused 
much of their attention on the human rights abuses related to mining, including forced child 
labour and sex slavery to help create awareness for the cause. While before this new-found 
attention, conflict minerals seem like a distant problem; however, the campaign tied western 
consumerism and technological advances, to the perpetuation of this issue in the Congo, turning 
it into an accountability problem. By initiating a consumer driven movement, Obama’s 
                                                 
3 IMF (2015). Democratic Republic of the Congo. IMF Country Report. Pp. 20 
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administration responded by adopting the 1502 Dodd-Frank Consumer Protection Act, which 
requires companies that may be using conflict minerals, to register with the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission and disclose full transparency of their supply chain. Yet as the legislation 
was enforced in 2010, the effects on the ground are only now being felt and there is backlash on 
its effectiveness. Recently, there has been a great debate that the law is now punishing the wrong 
people, and the Trump administration is considering overturning the Dodd-Frank Act, especially 
its conflict-free minerals component.4  
The existing approaches to tackle the governance of minerals in Congo have been 
unsuccessful in formalising the sector, primarily because they have overlooked fundamental 
causes of the instability in the country. International and regional laws have been created and 
applied in response to armed actor involvement in the mineral trade, however, it is clear now that 
these have neglected to first understand the broader implications before coming into practice. 
The premature application of global legal standards and the de facto ban that occurred in 
response, was detrimental to those who depended on the DRC mineral trade, as their steady 
livelihood strategy disappeared overnight. The sector became unpredictable thereafter, as the 
Congolese government began amending their domestic laws to include new mining regulations 
and natural resource management became a part of the regional political agenda. When these 
efforts became limited in its scope, industries that use the 3T’s, companies and NGOs groups 
across the globe, all took it upon themselves to solve the crisis in the Congo and began developing 
their own governance strategies and due diligence schemes for ethical consumerism. 
These various projects while set out with good intentions, have not been as effective as 
one would have hoped mainly because they have been created and implemented with minimal 
local involvement. While an international approach is helpful for an effective resource 
governance, the lack of local knowledge and understanding of all the interlinking dynamics that 
                                                 
4 Rappeport, A. and Flitter, E. (2018). Congress Approves First Big Dodd-Frank Rollback. The 
New York Times.  
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effect the mining industry in Congo has hindered the progress of these campaigns. The majority 
of current initiatives are primarily top-down approaches, designed by leading industry 
organizations and governments, which have a narrow-minded and result orientated attitude 
towards mineral governance. While this approach appeared successful for the case of ‘blood 
diamonds’, a copy-paste solution of supply chain monitoring has not worked in the DRC as it 
fails to address the localised underlying cleavages of conflict, such as ethnic frictions and land 
rights.  
With the story of Congo’s minerals being so pivotal and intricately tied in to Western 
technological advancements, it is clear that we cannot just continue to fashion laws to solve such 
a complex issue. While the link between technology, globalisation and conflict has been highly 
publicised in modern media, there is a need for this to be academically researched and analysed. 
This leads me to the basis of my paper, which aims to understand why resource conflicts, 
particularly in the context of the DRC, continue to persist despite garnering worldwide 
awareness, improvements in international law and increased stakeholder involvement in its 
regulation. I wish to examine and unpack the unintended consequences of international 
intervention and law implementation on the mineral trade of the Congo, especially in relation to 
the Western technology sector. I argue that natural resource governance within the Congo is in 
need of a more holistic approach to understand the conflict and is likely to be unachievable 
without first rebuilding trust and transparency in the reigning state, as well as strengthening the 
local governing structures tasked with this. 
I seek to explore the issue of ‘conflict minerals’ and natural resource governance via a 
comprehensive case-study of the Congo. Employing a historical and institutional analysis of the 
nation and expansion of the mineral industry, by tracing the creation and development of these 
key structures over time. I will conduct a case comparison of laws, treaties and other initiatives 
designed to formalise the artisanal mining (ASM) sector in the country, by documenting both the 
changes to laws and provisions which have stayed the same. My research process will trace the 
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various procedures over time, and evaluate the effectiveness of these schemes, in attempts to 
recognise the short comings of current mining regulations. The weaknesses of international 
mediation that are uncovered by this paper, I hope will provide insight into future theories of 
high-valued resource governance in historically weak states. 
This thesis begins by first introducing the leading aspects of the current literature on the 
resource curse and its relationship to armed violence. I assess the role that natural resource wealth 
has played in the past, and how these tie in to the narrative of the conflict in the DRC. The 
literature review explores the rise of foreign accountability norms that have arisen due to 
aggressive advocacy campaigns and summarise the various policy outcomes. Next, Section 1 
will outline the story of conflict minerals through the Congolese account. Chapter 1 will dissect 
the evolving nature of the conflict in the Congo. It will uncover the origins of the violence and 
highlight the key sources of protracted instability throughout the region. This chapter will also 
examine the influence of Congo’s colonial past in its development and regional volatility which 
are equally responsible for the country we see today. Chapter 2 will then go on to trace the rise 
of Congo’s mineral wealth, providing an opportunity for us to acquaint ourselves with the ores 
that are the focus of the paper. It then follows the development of the ASM sector in the country, 
emphasising the importance and use of these precious resources in the global context. Chapter 3, 
still concentrating on the extraction and supply chain of the minerals, explores how a weak rule 
of law and institutional capacity can easily trigger militarization of minerals and how it continues 
to permit criminalisation of the trade. This includes current institutional pitfalls that has riddled 
the Congo and its governing elites, despite improvements in domestic laws and creation of new 
bodies to combat this.  
I will then move into the second part of my paper where I will unpack how the topic came 
into the international public sphere, how it was included on the political agenda for international 
organisations, and the various initiatives created as a result of this heightened attention. It begins 
with Chapter 4, which follows the rise of Congo’s mineral fame amongst the international 
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narrative, how it became such a ‘hot topic’, the birth and adoption of ethical consumerism and 
why this issue in particular will continue to dominate headlines. Chapter 5 outlines and critically 
evaluates one of the most famous pieces of legislation enacted by the Obama administration to 
tackle this in 2010, the Section 1502 Dodd-Frank. Chapter 6 then seeks to outline the other 
initiatives that have arisen as a result, whether it be industry driven, company enacted or 
intergovernmentally agreed. I will then conclude my paper with a discussion on these strategies, 
aiming to uncover the missing link between them and analysing the significance of such a broad 
and fragmented approach in natural resource governance. 
Literature Review 
Between 2001 and 2013, a large body of literature examining the relationship between 
natural resources and civil war has been explored by many academic researchers5. The term 
‘resource curse’6 was first coined by the economist Richard M. Auty in 1993, as he noted that 
countries with rich natural resources often tend to develop more slowly, with more violence, 
corruption and with more authoritarian governments than others. This ironic phenomenon peaked 
world-wide interest and caused many scholars to explore this relationship in greater depth and 
with regards to different types of resources. Sachs and Warner7 build upon Auty’s theory and 
introduces the notion of ‘Dutch Disease’, by which the discovering of natural gas reserves in 
Holland, increased foreign currency reserves in the country and thereby the increased demand 
for guilder (former currency). The change in demand thus strengthened the currency which led 
to more expensive Dutch exports in the international market, rendering them uncompetitive and 
negatively affected other parts of the economy. Additionally, there is also the insinuation that 
                                                 
5 Ross, M. (2015). What Have We Learned about the Resource Curse? Annual Review of 
Political Science 
6 Auty, R. (1993). Sustaining development in mineral economies: The Resource Curse Thesis. 
pp.1 
7 Sachs, J.D. and Warner A.M, (1997) “Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth.” 
Working Paper for Center for International Development and Harvard Institute for International 
Development.  
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countries with large amounts of resource wealth undergo less economic development or 
innovation than those which are less reliant on the resource trade.  
Collier and Hoeffler8 took the previous theories of the resource curse and built upon them 
by examining the phenomenon in relation to civil conflict. The authors suggest that there is a link 
between civil conflict and natural resource wealth, and their explanation for this relationship falls 
into one of two categories. They state that natural resources such as oil and minerals, can lead to 
war by either using profits to finance war or are the motive for civil war. The theory behind their 
hypothesis is that natural resources that do not require a large amount of machinery for extraction 
can be a great source of funding for armed groups as the industries tend to be location specific. 
If rebels were to attack and extort money from other types of businesses, it is likely that they will 
re-locate to an area more stable. Mineral and oil extraction however, are not able to move and so 
rebels are able to extort these for a cut. Rebels are able to use the profits from this racketeering 
to buy arms, hire soldiers and initiate a rebellion. The authors findings seem to confirm that 
primary commodity exports substantially increase the risk of conflict, they attribute this 
correlation to the resources proving opportunities for extortion which can be used to prolong 
conflict and also acts as an incentive to engage in conflict. 
Furthermore, another early argument made by the scholars in the natural resource- civil 
conflict literature, explored the notion of resources creating a ‘grievance mechanism’9. This 
suggests that the presence of natural resources create instability and unrest among the local 
population surrounding the extraction by either disproportionate land expropriation, 
environmental hazards, insufficient job opportunities or other social disruptions associated with 
economic inequality. These factors suggest that injustice and inequality is enough of a motivator 
to trigger violence and civil conflict around natural resource areas. However, this should mean 
that armed groups target the resource sector and violence should be directed and contained 
                                                 
8 Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A. (2004). Greed and grievance in civil war. Oxford Economic 
Papers 
9 Ibid. pp.570 
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towards these industries not prevalent throughout the country. Scholar’s following this line of 
thought have so far, not proved this to be a very substantial basis of natural resource-conflict 
theory. 
Many subsequent studies have used Collier and Hoeffler’s initial ideas on the “looting 
mechanism”10 and tested their theory in line with more recent conflicts as well as exploring the 
relation of conflict to different types of natural resources. Some feel that those studying this topic 
fail to recognise that civil war may have begun before the first act of violence has been 
committed. There could have been many years of low-level hostilities prior to the civil war, 
which may have indirectly contributed to the unstable environment allowing natural resource 
extraction to be exploited in times of warfare. This includes studies on how civil war and resource 
dependency could be caused by weak governmental, economic and legal systems. There have 
been conflicting discourses on the role of governance and the exploitation of mineral resources. 
Some academics11 view illegal natural resource exploitation as a by-product of frail 
establishments, yet another theory is that the weak public infrastructure make the state dependent 
on their natural resource exports. This reverse causality theory assumes that political power is 
therefore hinged on the control of these resources, which in turn can act as an incentive for armed 
groups who see natural resource control and political power as synonymous12. Hence, conflict 
waged by armed militias in order to control these key resources were seen as an act of defiance 
and political grievance. The control of minerals and other natural resources, therefore, become a 
symbol of power, as it represented a vital source of the reigning government’s income which 
could be wielded as a political bargaining chip. 
                                                 
10 Ross, M. (2004). How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence from Thirteen 
Cases. International Organization. 
11 Cuvelier, J., Vlassenroot, K. and Olin, N. (2014). Resources, conflict and governance: A 
critical review. The Extractive Industries and Society 
12 Tsabora, J. (2014). Fighting The ‘Resource Wars’ in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: 
An Exploratory Diagnosis of the Legal and Institutional Problems. The Comparative and 
International Law Journal of Southern Africa 
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Other scholar’s such as Michael Ross note that there have been many disagreements over 
the correlation between natural resource and conflict, especially in regards to which resources 
are significant and which dimension they influence13. He notes that it is important to first 
distinguish which mechanisms are at play as policies will depend on the role of natural resources 
in the conflict. Ross uses the previous literature on natural resources and civil war in How do 
natural resources influence civil war? Evidence from Thirteen Cases to examine which causal 
mechanisms have been most significant over recent resource related conflicts. He explores nine 
hypotheses relating to three suspected relationships; resource and the cause of conflict, resource 
exploitation prolonging conflict and the intensity of war attributed to the accessibility of 
resources. In his research, he confirms a connection between natural resource and conflict, but 
also through examining thirteen different cases of conflict, he notes the resources seem to 
contribute to the outbreak of conflict in ways unpredicted by the hypotheses. He finds that in the 
two cases of conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (1996 and 1997-1999), natural 
resource wealth prolonged the conflict through the incentive method14. Ross recognised that the 
continuation of conflict in the DRC was due to two previously unseen or overlooked mechanisms 
in the standard literature, the emergence of a “booty future” market and the intervention of 
foreign state actors in the conflict. 
Foreign intervention and accountability is another aspect of conflict mineral literature 
which has been heavily studied and publicised in recent times. The literature has progressed from 
seeking to establish a link between conflict and minerals, towards a framework examining who 
is responsible, determining the basis of my thesis. The contemporary dialogue now addresses the 
many ways western states are adopting policies to address the issue of conflict minerals and 
calling for their companies to become more transparent in their supply source of minerals. Norms 
have arisen lately which promote foreign accountability to confront issues arising in resource-
                                                 
13 Ross, M. (2004). How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence from Thirteen 
Cases. International Organization pp.36 
14 Ibid. pp53 
 18 
led conflict areas abroad15. Advocacy groups and NGO’s have aimed to push companies to be 
held more accountable and to conduct due diligence, hoping that information sharing will lead to 
consumer condemnation and companies will act more responsibly. This push, in relation to 
conflict minerals mined in the DRC has led to the 2010 adoption of article 1502 Dodd Frank in 
U.S. legislation, which was largely a consequence of the Enough Project’s strategy paper, ‘Can 
You Hear Congo Now? Cell Phones, Conflict Minerals, and the Worst Sexual Violence in the 
World’16. 
The rise of foreign accountability and the implementation of Dodd Frank has shown the 
discourse in DRC’s conflict-mineral literature shift towards examining the repercussions of 
foreign responses to problems abroad. There has been backlash on the legislation and western 
advocacy efforts, as while enforced with good intentions, the effects of it on the ground are only 
just being seen and felt. Nicknamed ‘Obama’s Law’17, the implementation in DRC is having very 
negative unintended consequences. Another recent trend in the conflict mineral literature has 
moved away from its role in civil conflicts and towards observing resource mining and its link 
to human rights violations. As human rights issues have become more dominant in contemporary 
political debates, many scholars have explored this link causing many advocacy groups to emerge 
blaming western electronical companies as largely responsible. Researchers have discovered a 
link between artisanal mining and the increase of rape in the DRC18, arguing that these abuses 
have been permitted in mining regions which are largely militia controlled. 
                                                 
15 Partzsch, L. and Vlaskamp, M. (2016). Mandatory due diligence for ‘conflict minerals’ and 
illegally logged timber: Emergence and cascade of a new norm on foreign accountability. The 
Extractive Industries and Society 
16 The Enough Project Team with the Grassroots Reconciliation Group (2009). A 
Comprehensive Approach to Congo's Conflict Minerals. 
17 Seay, L. (2012). What’s Wrong with Dodd-Frank 1502? Conflict Minerals, Civilian 
Livelihoods, and The Unintended Consequences of Western Advocacy. Centre for Global 
Development 
18 Rustad, S., Østby, G. and Nordås, R. (2016). Artisanal mining, conflict, and sexual violence 
in Eastern DRC. The Extractive Industries and Society 
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The issue and abuses surrounding ‘conflict minerals’ has gained popular international 
attention in the media in recent times, primarily after the 2002 war in DRC, which led to a 
mountain of advocates and human rights lawyers from taking up the cause. Many NGO’s and 
international organizations were created aiming to tackle this issue, following enough project’s 
claim that those in the West were unknowingly perpetuating the conflict in the Congo and leading 
to the death of many civilians. This claim was huge and eventually more protesting led to the 
government adopting the 1502 Dodd Frank legislation. This was the turning point as we now 8 
years later are finally realising the real implications of “Obama’s Law”. A critique of all these 
evolving narratives on natural resources and conflict in the DRC, is that they fail to incorporate 
the views of the current government and local actors. The recent debates on the resource curse 
are too focused on the international aspect of pin pointing blame and responsibility in mineral 
mining, that they fail to understand the global, regional and national interaction of the industry 
and nature of the trade.  
Understanding the nature of the resource curse itself is crucial and “thus, the investigation 
and delineation of the role of law in tempering or preventing such resource curses is vitally 
important given the emergence of new forms of legal institutions that directly regulate these 
relationships”19. Similar to the issue of ‘Blood diamonds’, conflict minerals have garnered the 
same media attention today, that The Kimberley Process was born from in 2000. Since its 
implementation, the law has been referred to by some scholars, NGOs and governments as a 
“model for the governance of other commodities for which there is significant inadvertent 
funding of conflict”20.  The Kimberley Process was founded from a push by leading civil rights 
organisations, who were concerned about the damaging social effects of the ongoing illegal 
diamond trade. Their campaigns and concern succeeded in getting the issue taken seriously by 
                                                 
19 Wexler, L. (2009). Regulating Resource Curses: Institutional Design and Evolution of the 
Blood Diamond Regime. Pp.1718 
20 The World Bank (2018). Ian Bannon & Paul Collier, Natural Resources and Conflict: What 
We Can Do, in Natural Resources and violent Conflict: Options and Actions. The International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Pp.13 
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the international community, allowing it to be included on the 55th session of the UN General 
Assembly in Kimberley, South Africa. They “recommended that the international community 
develop detailed proposals for a simple and workable international certification scheme for 
rough diamonds, based primarily on national certification schemes and on internationally 
agreed minimum standards.”21 
The Kimberley Process was therefore established as an international certification scheme 
in an attempt to regulate the trade in ‘rough’ diamonds, that is diamonds that were believed to be 
illegally mined by armed actors, financing wars against governments and linked to human rights 
abuses. The process is unique in that it is not an international organisation or agreement, but it is 
“implemented through the national legislations of its participants.”22 Today there are 54 
participants, which represent 81 countries and claim to “actively prevent 99.8% of the worldwide 
trade23”. Nevertheless, as the process is now actively running in its 17th year, there have been 
many growing concerns and flaws recognised by experts and scholars alike.  
Wexler24 is one scholar who examined the regulation of natural resources with particular 
emphasis on the diamond certification process. He notes that there is a need to curb negative 
effects of the resource curse as it often leads to “poor economic growth and vulnerability to 
economics shocks, authoritarianism, corruption (and other forms of poor governance)”25 and civil 
conflict. He highlights that natural resources are not just an issue for illegal mining by armed 
actors, but also that the possibility of high rewards from such resources tempt those in positions 
of power increasing corruption and discouraging democracy. Narrowing this down to the 
diamond trade, he expresses that it is not only a singular state problem as many neighbouring 
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countries are also complicit, via smuggling or backing of militia-controlled mines. Exploring this 
multi-faceted issue, he suggests that “when multiple states need to be regulated, a commodity 
tracking system might provide a more sustainable approach.”26 With the successful involvement 
of international NGO groups and organisations, Wexler concludes that “The Kimberley Process 
provides compelling evidence to suggest that NGOs can simultaneously influence both states and 
business cartels to address the problems posed by resource curses,”27 and how these “efforts can 
be channelled into and through quasi-legal institutions.”28 
As the Kimberley Process continues in its implementation, many other Scholars29 have 
begun to realise its shortcomings in governing diamond trade and diminishing the associated 
human rights violations. Shaik-Peremanov distinguishes that a major limitation with the 
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), is that it focuses mainly on “non-state actor 
abuses while ignoring state and corporate abuses… [suggesting that] the international community 
acts to deny resources to rebel groups regardless of the nature of the underlying conflict.”30 
Additionally, viewing the scheme through a Zimbabwean case study, he suggests that it “risks 
becoming irrelevant and ineffective if it adheres to a narrow interpretation of its original core 
mandate and limits its human rights focus to human rights abuses committed by non-state 
actors.”31 
The history with the Kimberley Process is eerily similar to the backlash we are now 
experiencing with the current laws governing conflict minerals in the US. There has been 
growing concern to repeal the 2010 Dodd Frank legislation with the Treasury Department 
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releasing a new report urging Congress to repeal several policies mandated by the 2010 law.32 It 
is advocating to get rid of the provision which requires that companies disclose whether they use 
"conflict minerals" acquired from the Democratic Republic of Congo and the surrounding region 
afflicted by war. Like the KPCS, media outlets and academics alike are now realising and 
understanding the true implications and unintended implications on the ground in the DRC. 
Advocates of the Dodd-Frank believed that due diligence was a necessary step to combat 
mineral-led conflicts, yet in hindsight it is clear that they failed to account for or offer support 
for any possible negative repercussions. The announcement of the law in 2010 and the heightened 
international media attention, generated mixed reviews and widespread confusion, but led to 
other governments and industries scrambling to showcase their commitment to the cause. 
Congo’s government immediately responded by enacting a six month ban on any Congolese 
mineral exports between September 2010 and March 2011, and soon after the US Electronic 
Industry Citizenship Coalition (EICC) created a de facto embargo by refusing to buy minerals 
from the DRC that were not tagged as ‘conflict free’. The abrupt enforcement of these two 
policies left a sixth of the country, whose livelihood depends on mining, without any other way 
of generating income. Ironically in some cases, the lack of income alternatives for locals has 
pushed them into join militia groups. While it’s true that in many mining areas the presence of 
armed actors has decreased, but in other areas Congolese army officials have stepped in pushing 
native miners off the land and keeping the profits for themselves. The embargo itself also did not 
curb Congolese mineral exports as expected, instead bribery, extortion and smuggling increased, 
pushing the trade it wished to formalise deeper underground. It is due to these adverse unforeseen 
outcomes on the very local residents the legislation was aimed to protect, which has now caused 
the new US administration to re-evaluate section 1502.  
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This intervention into the literature and examination of the local dynamics of war are 
imperative in understanding resource governance in the DRC, as their institutions and societal 
barriers to formalisation have been shaped by their history. Yet, the existing literature and 
explanations to the resource curse are unable to capture the complexity of the continuing violence 
in the Congo, as. they do not account for the historical development of the trade, nor the local 
dynamics of war. While the issue is primarily a domestic problem, there are multiple tiers which 
need to be addressed simultaneously; that is the interaction between the village, regional and 
national levels. The current approaches glance over indigenous cleavages such as ethnic disputes 
and land rights, which has inherently lead to localised conflict. Moreover, there has been little 
research conducted on the political economy of resource curse33, its relationship to political 
accountability and the quality of domestic institutions. This thesis seeks to remedy these and 
offer a contribution to the prevailing studies of the resource curse, through the Congolese context. 
The conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo is unique, in that the resource wealth 
has attracted many other players into the arena making it a very complex problem. I aim to 
address this by examining conflict minerals through the lens of neighbouring countries and their 
motives for getting involved in the ongoing ‘Africa’s War’, as well as, evaluating international 
and technological involvement as the best way to help bring stability to the Congo. The topic is 
growing in importance as the technology industry is rapidly expanding. With the sector 
constantly advancing and finding new ways to be efficient, there is an urgent need for conflict 
minerals to be thoroughly explored. With electric cars rumoured to be the next ‘big thing’, it is 
now more important than ever to find a viable national and international solution to the regulation 
of conflict minerals as the demand for cobalt is set to surge in the future. My paper therefore aims 
to dissect the transforming role of conflict minerals in creating, prolonging and attracting foreign 
intervention in the ongoing conflict in the DRC. 
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Chapter 1: The Evolving Nature of Congo’s War  
The great Congo war has been internationally portrayed as a power, land and resource-
led struggle over control of the nation’s precious minerals. Yet while many attribute the conflicts 
as being a by-product of the resource curse, blaming it on the very nature of the region, which is 
a very narrow-minded interpretation. There are so many underlying internal battles and hostilities 
contributing in some way to the violence, which are imperative to understand before we can 
analyse the role of minerals amidst this. Fighting in Congo’s war has been prevalent since the 
1990’s. Now over 25 years on, it is not impractical to assume that the nature and cause of war 
has changed dramatically over the years, however, the fundamental causes of conflict still remain 
unaddressed. What makes the Congolese war different from any other conflict of the continent, 
is the vast number of actors and armed groups regionally and domestically involved.  
The continuation of the war itself today, has “no overarching narrative or ideology to 
explain it”34, but yet involves many ordinary people fighting as combatants for numerous causes. 
It leads us to question the motives behind these groups and what the core disputes are primarily 
about. Throughout this section, I argue that in contrast to the dominant global narrative of Congo 
and its minerals; local disputes over land, ethnicity and identity construction have had a crucial 
part to play in the onset of violence tormenting the Democratic Republic of Congo today, whose 
formation and role is best understood through a historical analysis. I then go to explore how these 
small-scale disputes have tended to get swept under the carpet and overlooked during 
peacebuilding efforts, which left unresolved, have had the capacity to develop into full blown 
regional conflicts. 
Colonialism 
Congo’s ongoing war is multifaceted and multi-layered, the violence has swelled and 
expanded into containing wars within wars. Nevertheless, the persistent instability of the DRC 
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and the surrounding region is not a new phenomenon, it has deep seeded roots from its historical 
rule and has been cultivated by its unequal development. Congo has explicitly been plagued by 
a pattern of exploitation and authoritarian rule stemming from its colonial era under King 
Leopold II. Leopold claimed Congo for himself in 1885, launching the Congo Free State directly 
under his control. He ruled as a dictator until 1908, where the nation was then sold over to Belgian 
rule. The colonial empire founded administration and was also pivotal for the establishment of 
the mining industry in Congo, as they focused their attention to extracting resources from the 
country. Like most colonial rulers of the time, the Belgian’s maintained a realm of segregation 
amongst the local administration, ensuring white supremacy overpowered the elites.  
The Belgians were also somewhat responsible for the now apparent and significant 
friction between the Congolese population and those of Rwandan heritage in the nation. During 
their reign, the Belgian government focused their attention on extracting rubber and minerals 
from the DRC and were in desperate need of labourers to meet their demands. Between 1937-
1957 they imported around 175,000 Rwandans under the ‘Mission d’Immigration des 
Banyarwanda35, having always admired them for their hardworking spirit. Following the 
disruption during Rwanda’s independence, a further 100,000 more fled into the country and by 
1970, Rwandans living in Congo “made up over 70 percent of the population”36 in the Masisi 
region. Land was taken and expropriated to the foreigners and soon “Hutu farmers and Tutsi 
ranchers came to dominate the local economy”37. Furthermore, the colonizers assigned the higher 
administrative positions to those with Rwandan ancestry than the indigenous Congolese 
community, giving them access to more political and economic power. This undoubtedly led to 
the foundation of some tensions between the newcomers and the local Congolese Hunde 
community who had lived there for generations, which would later play a pivotal role in the wars 
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that followed. The uneasy relationship was further aggravated in the years following Congo’s 
Independence, due to the questionable governing tactics of Congo’s next kleptocratic leader. 
Mobutu Rule – 1965 – 1997 
The authoritarian rule of President Mobutu Sese began when the Belgian colonial reign 
ended in 1960, and the intermediary leader, Patrice Lumumba, was ousted in 1965 by a joint 
CIA-backed coup. Mobutu’s leadership drove the country into economic chaos, developing 
policies which hindered economic development, encouraged corruption and benefitted political 
elites while thwarting any potential political rivals. The strength of the Congolese state and its 
institutions declined during Mobutu’s presidency, leaving the country largely to fend for itself. 
He misdirected funding and resources away from the army and public establishments, which 
heavily stifled the growth and development of the nation. Despite robbing the country to satisfy 
his own personal agenda, Mobutu was able to maintain his hold on the country for thirty-two 
years, renaming the country Zaire in 1971. His regime weakened all governing bodies, 
diminished the rule of law throughout the nation and aggravated ethnic tensions, setting up a 
perfect storm of conditions which allowed the administration to crumble when a disturbance in 
the neighbouring country of Rwanda permeated into the DRC. 
Rwandan Genocide – 1994  
Restlessness amongst the Eastern side of the DRC was primarily triggered by and 
flourished during 1994, whereby the spill over effects from the genocide occurring in Congo’s 
smallest neighbour, sparked a huge humanitarian crisis in the region. The vast repercussions of 
the ethnic cleansing crossed the border into the Congo, as over a million Hutu’s, civilians and 
militia men fled the bloodshed. Congo experienced the continuation and extension of the 
Rwandan civil war, as the Rwandan armed forces (FAR), a predominantly Hutu militia group, 
allegedly used the border as protection to regroup and devise attacks back in their home soil. 
Fighting amongst the border continued as fleeing Rwandan’s set up camps in Goma and around 
Lake Kivu which were a mere few miles away from their home territory. Refugee settlements 
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unexpectedly grew along the border, which were largely ill managed and ill equipped to handle 
the sheer numbers fleeing to safety. 
The biggest dilemma and destabilizing feature to Eastern Zaire during this time came 
from the endangerment caused by Rwandan militia men, who camouflaged themselves amongst 
civilians in refugee camps. This threat alone maintained a constant air of violence and insecurity 
in the region, while political elites in Kinshasa either underestimated the risks posed by this or 
had no interest in mediating nor dissipating the danger. This allowed Paul Kagame, Rwanda’s 
new leader, to use this to his advantage and as justification for the consequent invasions of the 
refugee camps by his army. The militarization of the refugee camps provided globally acceptable 
‘just’ cause for the consequential attacks in eastern Zaire, as the Rwandan army invaded the 
region and provided support for Congo’s anti-Mobutu movement led by the rebel group, Alliance 
for Democratic Liberation (AFDL). 
The mass forced displacement of refugees and armed rebels alike into the Congo, 
exacerbated local grievances that were festering prior to the crisis. Local ethnic tensions were 
bubbling, due to the influx of Hutu’s into a predominantly Tutsi area. In the months following 
the genocide, Mobutu was seen by the region as supporting the FAR over the Rwandan Patriotic 
Front (RPF) who were in power in Kigali. His allegiance to the FAR was primarily down to the 
close personal friendship he had with Habyarimana, Rwanda’s former president, before his plane 
was shot down under mysterious circumstances. As the warfare waged on, Mobutu’s loyalty and 
partnerships with Western allies and militia groups angered his neighbours. Throughout the mid-
1990s, many African leaders grew to dislike and distrust Mobutu. He was viewed as supporting 
their enemies, refusing to separate soldiers from the refugees, and also failed to use his diplomatic 
position to negotiate an understanding. Nation heads of Uganda, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia and Tanzania were unified by their common hatred for the Congolese dictator, making 
it easy for Kagame and his Ugandan ally, President Yoweri Museveni, to launch a regional quest 
to overthrow Mobutu.  
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Ethnicity and a sense of national identity when directed and contorted by political elites, 
has played a huge role in conjuring up violence not just in the Congo, but all over Africa. It was 
a tactic used to maintain control during the Colonial administration, and for the case of Rwanda, 
racial prejudices were exacerbated by a popular rhetoric convincing the dominant Hutu 
population that the Tutsi minority would soon become a threat if nothing was done. Similarly in 
the Congo, as Mobutu’s power was declining throughout the 80’s, he conjured up old grievances 
and ethnic hostility in attempts to maintain his hold on the presidency. The DRC has had an 
overwhelming history of violence, suspicion and scapegoating manipulated by leaders to 
maintain and generate support. Particularly, Mobutu’s continual mistreatment of the 
Banyamulenge, a small Tutsi community that settled previously in Zaire, fostered an anti-Tutsi 
sentiment in the country which he used to enhance his popularity. The Banyamulenge group and 
other members of Rwandan descent were mainly spread out in the Southern Kivu province, 
leading to instability throughout the region in 1981, when Mobutu publicly reversed the blanket 
citizenship law, ten years after its implementation. This created hostility between the indigenous 
residents and the newly branded immigrants, many of which had settled in the area for 
generations. 
Additionally, this political manoeuvre was acutely risky as tensions between the varying 
ethnicities were heightening across the entire region. Both Rwanda and Burundi at the time were 
also going through their own clashes between their Hutu and Tutsi populations. Therefore, 
ostracising the ‘alien settlers’ due to their Rwandan heritage triggered many of the youths to join 
the RPF rebellion in Rwanda, further reinforcing the divide in Congo once the battle progressed 
over the state boundary. The Kivus region felt the full impact of the Rwandan civil war, as the 
fighting transpired into the locality “driving a wedge between communities.”38  
 
 
                                                 
38 Stearns, J. (2011). Dancing with monsters. New York: PublicAffairs. Pp.75 
 30 
Congo War I – 1996-1997 
Anti-Tutsi ideology was at the forefront of most of the violence erupting in 1996, as the 
“successive leaders on both sides of the ethnic divide have only cynically fanned these flames.”39 
Ethnic prejudice flourished, partly due to the poor economic conditions rampant under Mobutu. 
Congo faced low economic development, poverty, rising inflation and inequality, which provided 
fertile terrain for racial discrimination to act as a scapegoat. The autocrat’s strategy of divide and 
conquer worked well up until his paranoia eventually overtook his judgement. Mobutu’s mistrust 
in his own officers led him to misdirect resources away from the national army, instead funding 
separate paramilitary units. He “cannibalised his own state” and kept the army weak, which 
largely enabled the success of the 1996 invasion by the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the 
Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL). Many Congolese welcomed the insurgency, tired of the 
conditions under Mobutu’s selfish rule, refer to this as the ‘War of Liberation’. The army 
commanded by low-level officers, who inherited the position after independence, crumbled under 
the invasion. They were decaying from years of being under funded and ill equipped, causing 
many to defect, selling whatever supplies they could muster. The AFDL rebels, spearheaded by 
Laurent Kabila arrive in Kinshasa on May 17th, 1997 seizing control of the state, yet he is only 
able to hold on to power for a year before Congo’s Second War beings. 
Congo War II – 1998-2003 
Kabila’s previous close ties with the region deteriorated during his presidency, his former 
allies Rwanda and Uganda became alienated. Feeling threatened, he too stirred the ethnic 
hostility pot, reviving the anti-Tutsi sentiment and causing Rwanda to retaliate to their defence. 
Rwanda’s government, expressed that they only invaded Congo in 1998 to pursue those behind 
the Rwandan genocide, who they believed were hiding out across the border. The conflict ensued 
until 2003, by which it had escalated to become Africa’s War, earning “its name because at the 
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height of the war eight African nations and over 25 militias were in the combatant mix”40. Due 
to varying causes the region was split; Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi against Angola, Namibia, 
Chad, Zimbabwe and Congo. Kabila’s repressive command frustrated a large majority of his 
citizens, glad to be rid of the former dictator, his replacement seemed to be no different. There 
was little economic development in the months following Kabila’s inauguration, causing a 
number of ordinary people to become combatants and join one of the many groups in the 
resistance. It is here, during Congo’s second war, where the mineral resource abundance of the 
nation became more apparent and is linked to financing the violence. Rebel groups controlled 
large parts of fertile mining territory and for most of the states involved, “economic interests 
played a role but were woven into a complex web of domestic and regional, political and 
corporate considerations”41. In a large number of cases, mining heads signed deals with the rebels 
over the government, transitioning the trade into an informal economy. The incapacity and 
absence of the relevant authorities in these areas allowed the markets to operate outside the sphere 
of influence, and also left local disputes between chiefs, ethnic groups and disagreements over 
land rights to fester, ultimately destabilising any attempts at natural resource governance. 
Between 1999 and 2003 there were numerous attempts at a peace negotiation, with rebels 
profiteering off the persistent instability. The Lusaka ceasefire agreement, was signed by the 
heads of Angola, DRC, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe in 1999. Yet its 
failure to halt the fighting, caused the UN Security Council to establish MONUSCO (Mission de 
l'Organisation des Nations unies pour la stabilisation en République démocratique du Congo), 
which is “the UN’s largest and most expensive peacekeeping operation”42 for the Congo. Some 
warlords built rebel movements and controlled large parts of territory during this time, using 
political motivations as a smokescreen for their mineral wealth gains. For politicians and states 
involved, “economic interests played a role but were woven into a complex web of domestic and 
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regional, political and corporate considerations.”43 Kabila was rumoured to have struck many 
deals in the area, using mines and resources to finance the war, trading them for military 
assistance. Similarly, Rwanda and Uganda have been condemned for doing the same during their 
occupation of Eastern Congo, using their takings to fund operations. This is the narrative that 
soon came to dominate western media’s understanding of the second war, stories of mineral 
exploitation, rape and murder in the Congo which brought attention to the plight of Congolese 
miners, but over simplified the root origins of the fighting.  
Achieving peace during this time was always going to be a turbulent mission. Congo 
faced weak and corrupt governance led by elites, seeking to fulfil their personal agendas above 
the nations. Its institutions and infrastructure were failing due to the onset of violence, which 
hindered any potential investment and development. Additionally, the continued volatility over 
decades in the region, had created a huge refugee and internal displacement strain on DRC’s 
economy, which policymakers manipulated into aggravating ethnic tensions. These issues were 
made even more difficult by the conventional ‘top-down’ peacekeeping approach adopted by 
international actors in attempts to remedy the war. Head way was seen to be made after Joseph 
Kabila took power following Laurent Kabila, his father’s assassination in 2001. His style of 
governance immediately differed from his predecessor’s, by resuscitating the stalled peace 
process and seemingly eager to comply with the UN.  
Transitioning towards peace & democracy – June 2003-Dec 2006 
Once Joseph Kabila came into power, he ousted and replaced almost the entire cabinet 
that governed alongside his father and began focusing on pleasing the international ties 
previously neglected. Starting in 2002, inter-Congolese dialogue was facilitated between political 
parties and the various rebel factions but excluded some Rwandan affiliated groups. By the end 
of 2002 due to international pressure, Rwanda and Uganda both withdrew their troops from 
Congo and a regional settlement to set up a transitional government in the DRC was reached. 
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They agreed that the new transitional government would share power between the former 
government and rebels, with democratic elections vowed to be held within two years after 
enactment. This was sworn into action in July 2003, where Joseph Kabila was affirmed as the 
new provisional president, splitting the power between four vice-presidents, of which two were 
former rebel leaders44.  
Maintaining peace and control during this transition period was still a bumpy road. There 
were still pockets of interim fighting and conflict persisting throughout the nation, despite 
reaching national and regional deals. Joseph Kabila faced three main threats to peace during this 
time; General Laurent Nkunda who launched a rebellion in the Kivus region, the Bas-Congo 
Province in Western Congo, who were rallying for the right to self-determinate, and those loyal 
to former vice-president Jean-Pierre Bemba. As aforementioned, it is clear that disagreements 
and grievances at the local level easily fed into larger conflicts that had the potential to undermine 
peace keeping efforts. Additionally, it was not helped by Joseph Kabila’s response to the various 
challenges as he reacted with unproportioned brutal force, echoing the repressive regime 
experienced at the hands of Congo’s former leaders. 
Nevertheless, on gaining power Joseph Kabila’s commitment to democracy remained 
strong, he held ‘free and fair’ elections in 2006, eventually winning the presidency in the run-off 
voting with “58 percent of the national vote”45. He was sworn in again as president on December 
2006 and began incorporating warlords and many armed groups into the national army. Yet his 
main opponent, Jean-Pierre Bemba, was openly very critical of Kabila’s governance following 
his defeat, and he accuses Kabila of vote rigging. Tensions between the supporters of both parties 
remained high, especially as there were sporadic events of violence directed towards Bemba’s 
camp in the lead up to the deciding election. Additionally during this political turbulence, Laurent 
Nkunda, a Tutsi rebel leader in North Kivu supposedly backed by Rwanda, defected from joining 
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the national army as agreed upon, instead choosing to fight them and expand his territory. His 
rebel troops, a part of the CNDP (Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple) maintained their 
arms worried about Kabila’s support of the Rwandan Hutu forces FDLR (Forces Démocratiques 
de Liberation du Rwanda) against them. As illustrated, ethnic based hostility is one of the main 
causes of the continuation of violence during this transitionary period and were detrimental to 
any attempts at peaceful negotiations. 
Local Ethnic Rivalries and Land Disputes 
Much of the recent violence in the DRC “has been driven by local grievances exacerbated 
by uncertainty at the national level.”46 Ethnic rivalries and tension in the DRC have 
predominantly occurred between the indigenous Congolese community and those of Rwandan 
descent. It has been fostered by society and intensified by politics and rights of citizenship. The 
origins of this can be traced back to colonial rule, particularly the Belgian Mission for the 
Immigration of the Banyarwanda. As mentioned previously, tens of thousands of Rwandan’s 
were imported into Congo by the colonisers, to provide the state with labour for mining and 
working on plantations. The Banyarwanda, a name now associated with all people with Rwandan 
ancestry, were favoured by the ruling elites. They were given authoritative roles in administration 
and special privileges, that were otherwise denied to the native Congolese. Friction between the 
two groups heightened following Congolese independence in 1960, as indigenous communities 
sought to re-establish their control of their territory. The Banyarwanda were stripped of their land 
and political power, using their lack of citizenship as just cause, which lead to the 1963 war of 
Kanyarwanda; “the first open conflict between Banyarwanda and indigenous Congolese.”47 
The divide in Congolese society was furthered by Mobutu’s partisan treatment of the 
Banyarwanda during his presidency. He supported and favoured ethnic minorities as a way to 
maintain his popularity without chancing a potential threat. Similar to the colonial regime, he too 
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promoted individuals of Rwandan lineage into top governmental positions, enabling them to push 
policies that promoted the interests of their community. Blanket citizenship was granted to 
Rwandans in 1972 to those who came to Congo before 1950, and in 1973, the general property 
law increased the territory under Banyarwandan control. These legislations heavily changed the 
dynamics of the region as citizenship enabled Banyarwandan’s to become the majority in some 
areas, increasing their economic, social and political influence over some main districts. 
However, this was short lived. In 1972, citizenship was revoked and only “those who 
could prove that their families were in Congo before 1885”48 maintained their rights. There was 
widespread distrust and fear throughout the country, hostility was maintained between the native 
Hunde groups and the ‘immigrants’ through complaints of corruption and access to political 
forums. Additionally, tension grew between the Hutu and Tutsi’s within the Banyarwanda 
community loosely reflecting the ongoing disturbances between the groups in Rwanda and 
Uganda. Micro-level conflicts spread from province to province, peaking during the Rwandan 
genocide. To Congolese nationals, the split in Banyarwanda Hutu’s and Tutsi’s was 
advantageous, presenting them with an opportunity to exploit this friction to solidify their stance 
in the provinces. Low-level incidents of violence between the two groups erupted in 1991, 
multiplying to engulf all of North Kivu by 199349. Local conflicts such as this soon became large 
enough to be self-sustaining and autonomous, destabilising the region for extended periods of 
time. 
Land scarcity and distribution is another factor fuelling low level conflicts in the DRC as 
over time, legitimate claims to the land have become skewed and it is hard to distinguish the 
rightful owner. Due to the very little bureaucracy and functioning state systems in place, there is 
little evidence to support these assertions. Despite the sheer size of the Congo, land is extremely 
valuable as it provides opportunities and sustainability for people’s livelihood. Owning land not 
                                                 
48 Autesserre, S. (2010). The Trouble With the Congo. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Pp. 137 
49 Ibid. Pp. 141 
 36 
only provides agricultural prospects but also mineral wealth, crucial to farmers and miners alike 
for making a living. Land was politicised during Mobutu’s reign, as he bestowed land to groups 
and officers as a reward for loyalty, especially in the Kivus region where land is especially 
valuable. This is also somewhat responsible for adding to the ethnic tensions mounting in the 
province too, as many Banyarwandans were given land that was taken away from customary 
chiefs. The problems surrounding identity construction and citizenship also became a lot more 
prized, as identity determined access to land and other benefits.  
Local agendas have really influenced Congolese history and “have been intertwined with 
macro-level dimensions”50. With the vast size of Congo comparable to the land mass of Eastern 
Europe, it is no wonder that it has faced so many secessionist and separationist attempts by 
various states and provinces. In 1960, the Eastern Katanga province launched a movement to 
detach itself from the Congo state and maintain the spoils from its rich copper wealth. The leaders 
responded with force and brutality as they deemed it as a challenge to their power, the fighting 
subsided, but the animosity remained. 
Ongoing Congo War III – 2008 
Eventually with all the violence transpiring between the many combatants, a peace deal 
was negotiated and signed in January 2008 between the government and 22 armed groups, 
including the political armed militia group CNDP established by Nkunda. Yet this is short lived 
as by July, both sides have engaged in violent clashes against each other and thus, the third Congo 
War begins. Nkunda and the CNDP movement magnifies, now with the purpose of overthrowing 
Kabila’s administration. Furthermore, there is continual and unresolved encounters with the 
Ugandan Rebel group LRA (Lord’s Resistance Army) in northern Congo. A second election was 
held in 2011, but due to multiple claims of fraudulence in the electoral process and growing 
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dissatisfaction with Kabila’s rule, the result is widely disputed and it was unclear as to who the 
legitimate winner was51.  
The foundations behind the persistent fighting during this time reflect a number of 
varying causes and ideologies. It is now deemed as one of the largest humanitarian crisis of all 
time52 by UN chief Antonio Guterres, with huge numbers of human rights violations occurring 
in recruitment and during insurgencies, with almost all rebel groups and parties complicit. 
Unnecessary mass killings, reports of rape, recruitment of child soldiers and mineral exploitation 
are amongst the main components of the lens that international communities view the war raging 
in the Congo, prompting a global response despite many unobvious civil, political and economic 
motivating factors.  
Current Situation 
Currently in the DRC, President Joseph Kabila’s term officially ended in 2016. But his 
refusal to step down and delaying of elections has permitted him to still be in office today. He is 
accused of reinterpreting the constitution wrongly, arguing that with no presidential elections, 
the president in office is permitted to remain in power indefinitely53. The international 
community has largely overlooked and ignored the obvious rule breaking, despite getting 
involved in a similar case in Ivory Coast. It leads us to question, why is Congo undeserving of 
international pressure? Jason Stearns, a former coordinator of the UN DRC Group of Experts has 
noted that nature of DRC’s violence is somewhat different to that experienced in current times. 
The root causes are extremely complex yet they are often interrelated, “with conflicts sitting 
inside conflicts sitting inside conflicts”54. Therefore, it is no wonder that with such a weak 
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government, rule of law and institutional capacity, how civil conflicts have been allowed to fester 
until reaching a national or regional outbreak. By the time peacekeepers can intervene, the 
situation has tended to progressively worsen beyond mediation. This vital flaw in Congo’s 
governance and its lack of effective accountability mechanisms has enabled and essentially 
maintained the exploitation of its natural resource wealth for generations. 
The fundamental causes of Congo’s unending conflict as outlined in this section, is 
multifaceted and has little to do with its natural resource deposits. The majority of the large-scale 
disputes have their roots primarily derived from ethnic rivalries and disagreements over land 
ownership, stemming from the Colonial era. These antagonisms have been skilfully manoeuvred 
by political elites and have been instrumental in shaping the governance of Congo’s natural 
resources. Subsequently, we cannot seek to understand how resources are managed without fully 
understanding the historical and institutional context. Examining the local dynamics in mineral 
rich regions of the country are essential to wholly comprehend all the interconnected factors of 
the industry, and motivations behind the strategies developed to control them.  
 
Chapter 2: The Rise of Mineral Wealth 
 
The DRC’s natural resource wealth has been apparent since their colonial rule in 1908, 
where the “Belgian colonial administration rapidly established and developed industrial, large-
scale mining (LSM) during the first half of the twentieth century,”55 searching for copper, tin and 
gold. In 1906, the Belgian government gave the ‘Société générale de Belgique’, a company 
closely linked to the state, a 99-year monopoly on mining rights of 13,000 square miles of mining 
tract in Katanga56. The Société générale, was responsible for creating three powerful companies 
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under them; Upper Katanga Mining Union which was later nationalised by Mobutu in 1967, the 
Bas-Congo to Katanga Railroad Company and the International Forest and Mining Company. 
LSM eventually declined when the nation gained independence in and the Belgian mining 
companies were nationalized under President Mobutu.  
Artisanal mining (ASM), that is small-scale “mining by hand,”57 has had a long history 
in the DRC. It first began in the early 1970’s, with participation heightening following its 
legalization in 1983. It is currently defined in the 2002 DRC Mining Code as: 
“any activity by means of which a person of Congolese 
nationality carries out extraction and concentration of mineral 
substances using artisanal tools, methods and processes, within 
an artisanal exploitation area limited in terms of surface.” 
 
ASM became a livelihood strategy for many due to the minimal need of machinery and 
easy processes of extraction. It grew in popularity when the largest state-owned mining company, 
Gécamines, collapsed during the 1990s58, and is now regarded as “one of the most important 
forms of employment in the DRC”59. When President Mobutu Sese Seko seized power in 1965, 
he nationalised the mining industry, creating the state mining company, Générale des Carrières 
et des Mines S.A. which was a rebranding of the former Upper Katanga Mining Union. However, 
he strategically placed family and friends in charge of governing its activity. The corrupt 
structures of power he developed to control Congo’s natural resources, allowed his inner circle 
and select elites to embezzle billions through the trade. The president used the mining company 
to finance his personal wealth, as well as fund his patronage networks, forcing all mineral exports 
to be sold through a state mineral board. During its peak in the 1970s and 80s, the Gécamines 
was the largest source of employment and income in the country, it “employed some 34,000 
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workers, ran farms, hospitals and schools for their benefit, and was the largest contributor to the 
state treasury”60. 
When Mobutu’s rule collapsed in 1990, as did the functionality of the Gécamines and the 
company began dissipating as a result of this and in conjunction with plunging world copper 
prices. Additionally, the rising instances of violence around the industry caused many expert staff 
to desert the company, causing severe managerial and production problems. Following this 
decline, Mobutu encouraged his prime minister, Kengo Wa Dondo, to begin privatising the 
mining sector in 1995, as the function of the official economy was coming to an alarming halt. 
The nature of mining operations throughout the Congo has changed drastically over the 
last few decades. What started as large-scale industrial operations, operated by a single company 
and usually involving heavy machinery, is now controlled by groups of Congolese and 
international firms, with artisanal mining continuing in parallel. In 1999 Mobutu’s replacement, 
Laurent Kabila, took steps to restore order to the mining sector, by establishing The Service 
d’Assistance et d’Encadrement du Small Scale Mining (SAESSCAM), a government body to 
oversee the industry. In an attempt to regulate and effectively harness the royalties from the 
mining sector, the government along with civil society and industry participants61 developed and 
published a new mining code in 2002, hoping to attract foreign investment. The code established 
special zones, “Zones d’exploitation artisanale (Artisanal Mining Zones or ZEAs) where 
industrial or semi-industrial mining is not viable”62. This enticed many Chinese and western 
mining companies to capitalise and take over former Gécamines sites. Yet due to a substantial 
lack of these ZEA sites country-wide the majority of mining is conducted informally.  
The main minerals mined in the DRC are the 3TGs; Coltan, Tin, Tungsten and Gold. The 
importance and demand of each mineral has fluctuated dramatically over the years primarily in 
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line with trending technological and electronic advancements.  Below is a table of the minerals 
ores regarded as ‘conflict minerals’ and sourced from the DRC, their refined product and uses. 
 
Table 1 – Minerals Mined in the DRC, Facts and Figures 
 
Mineral Ore Refined 
Product 
% of world 
production in 
DRC 
Primary Uses Main 
Location/Provinces63 
Casserite Tin 6-8%64 Solder, Cans, 
Automotive Parts 
Manemia (Kalima, 
Kailo, Lubutu) 
North Kivu (Walikale-
Bisie Mine), South Kivu 
(Kalehe Terrirtoy), 
Katanga 
Coltan 
(Columbite-
Tantalite) 
Tantalum 15-20%65 Capacitors, Alloys, 
Glass, Memory 
Chips 
Katanga (Manono, 
Kisengo, Sango) North 
Kivu (Masisi) and South 
Kivu 
Wolframite Tungsten 2-4%66 Air & Spacecraft, 
filaments 
Maniema (Kailo), South 
Kivu 
Gold - >1% Jewellery, Wiring Maniema, Katanga, 
North and South Kivu, 
Ituri 
 
General Mining Supply Chain 
Mining strategies adopted and the tools required vary upon the various minerals 
themselves, however, sourcing the 3TG’s in the DRC is typically undertaken via artisanal and 
small-scale methods. The simplicity and accessibility of ASM mining techniques is what caused 
it to gain popularity in Congo during the coltan rush, as well as offering civilians one of the 
largest employment opportunities since the decline of the agricultural sector. Despite being a 
largely informal market with little governmental oversight, the production of minerals is 
somewhat organized favouring micro-investments. Generally speaking, the supply chains begin 
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with the miners, creuseurs as they are locally called, who extract mineral ores. The miners obtain 
the resource by using inexpensive tools, often by hand or using very basic tools such as shovels, 
chisels, hammers and picks to search for the ores typically in make-shift mines. The rocks 
containing the precious mineral ores are then washed, sifted and sorted, often by women and 
children, before they sell their loot to traders or intermediaries. Water is a large and necessary 
component of the extraction process as it is required to separate the ores from the dirt and other 
components form the grounds. With little oversight governing proper mining procedures, 
constructing mines has numerous negative environmental effects, which erode the agricultural 
properties of the land and include deforestation, soil erosion and is detrimental to the wildlife. 
Although the chain is very labour intensive, global demands for the minerals ensure that small 
quantities of the minerals bear high rewards.  
The minerals are then transferred usually by hand, as mines tend to be geographically 
secluded, to local ‘négociants’ middle men. The négociants are typically situated in small towns 
and are the creseurs only access to the market. The minerals may travel through numerous 
négociants, before eventually being purchased by a mineral trading firm known as comptoir, 
which markets the spoils to larger companies. These trading hubs are usually situated in large 
towns, scattered throughout the eastern border and are more politically powerful, purchasing 
minerals at prices set by them. They maintain their purchasing power as they are a major source 
of revenue for the relative authorities. Here the precious stones are sorted and processed before 
being traded with global mineral trading firms. These trade deals are often based on long term 
pre-agreed contracts based on price and quantity. However, for the case of coltan, the mineral 
can also be sold via spot markets which are open and facilitated by specialist broking firms. The 
prices fluctuate freely and are advantageous to the négociants as the transaction and payment is 
immediate. At trading houses, the minerals are mixed with others from all over the world and are 
processed by plants mainly in Europe, Asia and North America into components, which are used 
to manufacture the final end products such as mobile phones and other hand-held electronics.  
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Figure 3: General Mineral Supply Chain in the DRC 
 
Coltan 
ASM particularly grew in popularity and significance during Kabila’s reign and the 
Second Congo War (1998-2003), where neighbouring countries conspired with Congolese rebels 
to overthrow the newly appointed leader. Kabila began cracking down on large foreign 
companies when he gained power and encouraged locals to mine for their livelihood as he saw 
little scope of reviving the mining industry. It is here where the importance and desirability of 
columbite-tantalite, a black metallic abbreviated to coltan, entered into effect. Raw coltan has 
found its worth through the digital age, as its presence in technology is becoming increasingly 
common at the expense of the locals who mine it. It is often mined in the DRC through ASM and 
small-scale methods, in order to meet shifting demand. After refinement, the ore is processed 
into a faded blue powder named tantalum which is used in many handheld technological devices 
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due to its many multi-functional properties. Tantalum is primarily used in the production of 
capacitors, it is a great conductor of electricity, has a high melting point and only small amounts 
are required67. The international price of Tantalum has fluctuated along with global demand, 
experiencing two sharp prices spikes in 1980 and 2000, seeing its demand peak during the release 
of SONY’s PlayStation console mid-200068. Coltan found its fame during this time, where many 
journalists linked it to warlords and the ongoing violence in DRC. The increased attention that 
Coltan drew, fuelled the surge in advocacy efforts and campaigns directed towards the region. 
Technology Boom  
The boom of mineral wealth in eastern DRC really materialised hand-in-hand with the 
rise of global technological developments. As the world is getting more conscious about 
renewable energy and creating reusable products to limit waste, people are starting to rely on 
rechargeable batteries. Cobalt is a crucial component in these lithium-ion rechargeable batteries, 
which is required for many portable electronic devices such as phones, laptops, tablets and 
electric cars. In the current climate, “more than half of the world’s total supply of cobalt comes 
from the Democratic Republic of the Congo”69, with 20% of this cobalt coming from creuseurs 
(artisanal miners) in the southern region. The majority of the time the product moves through a 
variety of routes, it ultimately ends up in the possession of Congo DongFang International 
Mining70 (CDM), a subsidiary Chinese company to Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt Company Ltd. 
(Hauyou Cobalt) and one of the largest cobalt producers in the world. CDM has been operating 
in Congo since 2006, they buy cobalt from traders, who buy directly from the miners. CDM 
smelts the ore at their site in the DRC before exporting it to their other smelting plants in China 
before they are sold to battery manufacturers.  
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Regulation  
Nowadays, the sheer scale of artisanal mining is astounding, with recent estimates 
suggesting that 20% of DRC’s exported cobalt is mined by 110,000 miners in Katanga71. The 
rise of mineral wealth in the nation has drawn a huge number of locals to the industry. There is 
“an estimated 750,000 to 2,000,000 artisanal miners in the DRC,”72 but it has also attracted 
criminalization and corruption, which currently runs rampant throughout the mineral trade in 
DRC. Domestic and international pressures in reaction to this, resulted in the creation and 
implementation of the 2002 mining code. The code outlined specific provisions for order and 
protections of those that work in the mining industry, as well as introducing miner permits, with 
requirements on who can mine. It sets out a list of approved mining sites and requirements on 
how to obtain legal mining authorisation from Ministry of Mines. The main aim of this new 
legislation was to attract foreign investors into the industry and it was followed a year later by 
the 2003 Mining Regulations, which sought to build upon and clarify its predecessor. 
Nevertheless, the consequences to these laws have made mining by the local population more 
difficult, more expensive and encouraged a large majority to go around the red tape, causing 
many to criticise the 2002 Mining Code for “favouring foreign investors at the expense of the 
local economy.”73 
There were proposals submitted to parliament during 2015 to revise the planned mining 
codes, President Joseph Kabila sought to “increase revenues from the industry by doubling taxes 
and royalties for miners”74. Yet these plans were foiled later that year, as commodity prices 
sharply declined and it was predicted that the new mining code would cost the country billions, 
potentially doing more harm than good. Investors and many other business officials, were 
worried that revising the 2002 code would be tricky, as many international investments were 
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conducted on the basis of that code. The lack of government presence or regulation in these 
mining regions is one of the main reasons as to why the industry has fallen into the hands militias 
and armed actors. Additionally, the mineral wealth of the nation has historically been used by 
political elites of the country and regional actors for generations, to enrich their personal fortune 
and fund their own motives. While international advocates call for more regulation in the mining 
sector, as we will see in the next chapter, it is important to first understand how the mineral trade 
in Congo was established, thereby giving more clarity on how best to tackle its susceptibility to 
criminalization.  
 
Chapter 3: Criminalization of the Mining Sector 
 
Criminalization of the mining sector in the DRC has occurred gradually over time and 
has been largely aided by the very government instated to protect it. With the country in 
prolonged instability throughout the 1990’s, the Congolese governmental officers were 
preoccupied warding off rebels and protecting the presidency, which meant that the expansion of 
the sector was generally left ungoverned. Furthermore, many top politicians and those in high 
offices used their positions to use the country’s mineral wealth to satisfy their own greed. The 
former dictator of Zaire Mobutu Sese Seko, accumulated enormous wealth by selling off the 
country’s resources, “he sold the minerals extracted through harsh labour conditions and kept the 
money for himself and his close supporters.”75 The lack of authority and rules surrounding the 
industry allowed it to develop inconsistently, pushing the profession into the informal market. 
The absence of regulation and the nature of the mining industry has enabled many armed groups 
and regional actors to become involved in the trade of Congo’s natural resources, each pursing 
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their own motivations. This next section explores the development of the mining industry and 
how it was so easily susceptible to corruption and criminalization. 
When minerals were first discovered in the DRC, the colonial empire began a reign of 
extraction and exploitation for personal gain, which has continued into the modern age. The 
“political elite used the sale of the country’s natural resources to enrich themselves and 
impoverish the rest of society”76, they got away with this by creating intricate economic networks 
to funnel the money through and keeping the mining trade relatively ungoverned. Before the 
Great Congo Wars started, the industry was beginning to become formalised and was largely 
owned by the state-run company SOMINKI, which was a large producer of gold, diamonds and 
cassiterite. Eventually production was halted during the 1990s, collapsing after the insurgency 
began against Mobutu. As the war raged on, Kabila’s administration and many other 
neighbouring actors traded Congo’s precious natural wealth for military assistance with their 
regional allies. Congo leveraged its copper, cobalt and diamond mines for Zimbabwean support 
against the Rwandan rebellion, while the RCD and Rwandan forces traded gold, coltan, tin and 
diamonds to fund their operations77. The Congolese government has been notorious for using 
mineral wealth as a bargaining chip with surrounding countries and foreign mining companies. 
Mining was disregarded by policing thereafter, as reoccurring violence and instability began 
seeping into the country. But the opaque nature of artisanal mining and the lack of transparency 
surrounding trade deals, enabled shady arrangements to resume occurring at the top. 
The “continuous state of conflict in the DRC benefitted armed rebels immensely” 78 and 
there have been numerous claims dominating the international narrative that the Second Congo 
War, which lasted between 1998-2003, was financed by mineral resource revenue. Thanks to 
“economic networks that had been established … during the first years of the Congo War, mineral 
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traders and military officers were perfectly placed to funnel it out of the country.”79 These 
networks were often incorporated by governmental actors under the guise of instability, as it was 
simpler to join them instead of setting up their own. Additionally, it was during this time that 
“forces from Rwanda and Uganda, along with numerous Congolese militia groups, established 
control of the production and trade in minerals throughout the Kivu provinces.”80 With the lack 
of state authority governing these parts, militia groups replaced customary chiefs and soon 
engaged in profiteering from the mining cycle. Rwandan and Ugandan illegal occupation of 
Congolese territory, made illicit exportation an increasing problem as it became common for 
surrounding countries to have a boost in mineral output, despite having questionable capacity to 
mine it all. 
The artisanal nature of mining minerals in the Congo is a key factor making the trade 
more vulnerable to armed groups as production can be easily controlled and manipulated by using 
violence. The natural resources itself are ideal for those looking to exploit it, as small quantities 
yield high rewards and once mined, the origins are hard to distinguish. Especially in the case of 
Coltan, there are a few tantalite deposits in Rwanda making it easy for “Rwandan-based exporters 
to mix tantalite from the Congo and Rwanda and plausibly claiming that the ores all comes from 
Rwanda.” 81 Due to the fluidity of the trade, mineral trade is lucrative to armed groups and 
fortunately for the belligerents, a large proportion of Coltan mines are close to the international 
border with Uganda and Rwanda, making smuggling a relatively untaxing task. Labour in the 
mines is also fairly cheap and there are no shortage of people wanting to work, as the conflict 
had rendered it one of the few remaining sources of employment left. Mining is a low skilled 
operation, making miners dispensable, and therefore mistreatment and human rights abuses 
towards the labourers were widespread. Additionally, as mining sites are often in remote areas 
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the ores are required to be transported by hand. There is frequent exchange and transportation of 
the rocks, which increases the scope for extortion. 
Criminalization of the mining industry has largely occurred due to the lack of capacity of 
governmental agencies to monitor and enforce safeguards for miners. Although in 1999, the 
government agency SAESSCAM was created to watch over the artisanal mining industry and 
improve mining condition, but they only have mandate to operate in the ZEA (authorized mining 
areas) areas82. “One of the manifestations of weak state capacity and conflict in the DRC is 
mining in areas where it is not permitted under law”83, therefore, as most artisanal mining is 
conducted outside the ZEA areas, many state officials from various governmental factions 
control access to these unsanctioned mining sites, benefitting from them by demanding unlawful 
duty from local miners. The deficiency of enforceable rules on mining strategies make it easy to 
corrupt and manipulate by higher authorities. While there are instances of militia men working 
with local miners to provide protection, many including the Congolese Army themselves have 
benefitted from the trade. The low pay of soldiers, make them more inclined to skim off the top 
of mining profits and are reason enough as to why some officers continue to try and maintain 
their control in mines. In militia-controlled territories, authorities stationed there can often get 
away with exploiting local miners as there are weak legal systems protecting them. 
The conflict and instability due to domestic and regional disputes in eastern DRC, further 
aides misconduct in the sector and also conveniently provides a smokescreen for all these illegal 
operations to continue thriving. The capacity of state services to oversee the artisanal mining 
sector has been extremely limited, which has not only permitted criminalisation, but also created 
opportunities for armed actors to profit. The state is inhibited to effectively govern due to wide-
spread corruption, lack of jurisdiction clarification and its inability to cover the vast territory of 
the Congo, lacking means, personnel, resources and technical knowledge. Armed militia’s in 
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mining areas can easily access the mining routes and have typically raised money for themselves 
through four distinguishable methods; theft, control of mining sites, taxation/extortion or control 
of trade/smuggling routes. Theft is easy for armed groups residing near mines, as miners usually 
operate individually and is a quick short-term way of making money. Moreover, as institutional 
capacity is inadequate, bureaucracy and data on the trade is largely unreliable and inaccurate. 
Information deficiency and discrepancy in the mineral business, makes it easier for companies 
to under-report production, avoiding taxation and helps armed groups get away with pillaging 
mining zones and smuggling their loot to surrounding countries. Mineral exchange and 
transactions are usually conducted in the absence of written contracts making them risky, if one 
party fails to uphold their end of their deal, there are often no repercussions.  Controlling mining 
territory or setting up road blocks along smuggling routes is another way for militias to profit, 
they can control entry in and out of the mines while taxing the export of natural resources. 
Uncertain land rights and unenforceable property law in the DRC, deters any resistance to the 
occupation of the mining territories by these combatants and some state elites, as previously 
mentioned, either turn a blind eye in return for an under-the-table pay off, or actively engage in 
the unlawful exploitation themselves. Some rebel groups may also directly own or become 
affiliated with certain comptoirs, enabling them to cut out the middle man, set the buying rates 
of the minerals or take a cut from the final profits. 
Much of the mining conducted in Congo today is largely informal and is deemed ‘illegal’. 
Presently, as stated in the 2002 mining code, “artisanal mining can only take place in designated 
Artisanal Mining Zones (AMZs) to be regulated and protected by the Service d’Assistance et 
d’Encadrement du Small Scale Mining (SAESSCAM)”84. Nevertheless, due to high demand for 
the ores and inadequate numbers of AMZ sites, much of the mining is conducted in unauthorized 
areas, trespassing on land owned by industrial mining companies. These unofficial mining areas 
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operate outside the sphere of influence, without any government influence and so it is easy for 
human rights violations to occur under the radar and for mine conditions to be extremely poor. 
Abuses such as extrajudicial killings, forced labour and child soldiers increased around rebel 
controlled mining areas, also giving rise to new illegal economies such as prostitution. The 
“absence of state authority in the eastern provinces reinforced the appeal of violence and deprived 
local actors of established avenues for peaceful resolution of existing antagonisms”85 unaffiliated 
to the war. Miners are also routinely cheated out of being offered fair prices for their loot, their 
lack of collective bargaining power, access to information on global prices, as well as the ability 
to determine the tantalite content of their ores, puts them a huge disadvantage, making them 
susceptible to intimidation by combatants and local authorities. Moreover, the vast increase in 
child labourers enticed into the mining trade when the industry boomed, signifies state failure 
and a lack of governmental emphasis on education. Children who are often recruited to mining, 
usually do so because they cannot attend school, either due to it being too expensive or they lack 
one close enough to their homes to attend. Some desperate families may also encourage their 
children to drop out of school and help make a livelihood for the rest of the family as the jobs 
were available for the unskilled and wages were decent. When mineral prices and demand rose 
dramatically, it also attracted many young children towards the trade as they believed it offered 
better opportunities than staying in education.  
As highlighted in this section, the militarization of minerals in the Congo has developed 
since their vast resource wealth was first discovered under Belgian rule and has since, become 
intrinsic to the growth of the industry as a whole. The issue was brought to the international 
forefront as global demand for coltan skyrocketed during the early 2000s due to the IT bubble, 
but the local price fell. This was a clear indication that artisanal mining was on the rise, as the 
market became flooded with cheap artisanal coltan. Large international companies opted out 
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from trading with industrial mines, as the artisanally mined minerals were significantly lower 
priced, attracting new players seeking to profit from the illicit trade somehow. Since then, the 
unpopular political governance, various regional and domestic disputes, as well as poor state 
influence, have fostered a prolonged unstable climate throughout Eastern DRC. The volatility 
and violence which affected the country, has in fact significantly helped the mineral trade 
continue to operate informally. Legitimate trading companies have avoided establishing offices 
and investing in the DRC due to fears of violence and looting, relying on intermediary traders, 
despite how corrupt their operations might be. Mining heads began signing deals with rebels 
instead of the Congolese government. Nevertheless, it was not long before advocates began 
linking natural resource exploitation to the perpetuation and continuation of the war in Africa. 
Their campaigns implicated international technology companies and western consumers as 
partially complicit to the horrors unfolding in the DRC, which caused a whole revaluation and 
restructuring of corporate accountability. 
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Chapter 4: How ‘Conflict Minerals’ became a hot topic and its current relevance 
 
The topic and debate surrounding conflict minerals has been very nuanced and complex 
since it first hit the media limelight in the early 2000’s. The conflict and war itself has been 
ongoing for the last thirty years, yet it has only recently caught worldwide attention in the last 
decade or so. Throughout the 2000’s, “a global human rights advocacy movement was mobilized 
to raise awareness of how certain raw materials in electronics came from mines controlled by 
armed groups in eastern Congo.”86 Highlighting the link between these natural resources and 
continuation of violence birthed the term, ‘conflict mineral’, which has taken over the Western 
collective consciousness in recent years. Despite the relationship between armed actors and 
conflict prevalent for many years before this, the awareness gained traction as consumers were 
now in the firing line, but the dominant narrative also placed them uniquely at the “heart of the 
solution.”87 
Generally speaking, within the human rights paradigm, international concern typically 
arises when there is a threat to the internal peace and security of a nation, which escalates when 
conflicts have the potential of crossing borders.88 The origins of the “conflict minerals” campaign 
itself can be traced back to 2001, where a panel of UN experts “recommended an immediate 
embargo on the trade in minerals from the eastern DRC due to their systematic exploitation by 
armed groups as a means to finance their activities”89. The subject then entered the mainstream 
spotlight when the American non-governmental organization (NGO) The Enough Project, 
funded by the Center for American Progress, adopted the cause in 2008 with their Raise Hope 
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for Congo campaign. The organization set out to educate the public and shift attention towards 
the ongoing conflict in the Congo, which had been largely absent in popular media coverage. 
They focused their efforts on establishing the “role of conflict minerals funding the conflict, and 
the effects of sexual violence as a weapon of war,”90 seeking to end violence by armed groups, 
by tightening regulation and restrictions on the trade of tin, tungsten, coltan and gold. The 
movement sought to follow in the same footsteps of the successful blood diamonds campaign, 
which saw its popularity rise in 1998. NGOs often face the dilemma of whether to invest in 
creating large-scale public awareness campaigns, or to strategically focus on influencing the main 
policy-makers. Yet, the impact of the blood diamond initiative “suggests that public awareness 
is what gives strategic policy efforts room for manoeuvre”91. Those bringing blood diamonds to 
the forefront of western attention, saw really high response in public engagement following their 
lead, which contributed to the swift and effective implementation of the Kimberley Process 
Certification Scheme (KPCS) five years after the issue was first discussed.  
However, the global arena for justice is hugely saturated, and garnering attention towards 
Congo’s minerals was initially a large struggle as competition to be the most influential 
humanitarian issue of the year is tough. Unlike the blood diamonds campaign, the majority of 
the 3T minerals are relatively unexciting and lack the allure and charm of precious stones. 
Advocates understanding this, took an alternative approach while trying to put mineral mining 
on the global agenda. They began tying natural resource exploitation to the current rising trend 
in alleviating human rights issues in the region connecting the impact of coltan fever during the 
1990’s to the rise of child labour in the region. In conjunction with the rising human rights 
movement and drive for ethical sourcing of natural resources, international attention was then 
primarily directed to stopping the widespread stories of rape and child soldiers, which dominated 
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the DRC story. This also worked hand in hand with the emerging ideology originating from the 
effects of globalisation, whereby there was a more prominent call by global consumers to ensure 
that the products they use in their day to day lifestyle, conform to certain ethical and 
environmental standards. Many of the organizations involved in campaigning about conflict 
minerals were already engaged with issues affecting the Congo, and fiercely adopted the cause 
once concern for the Congo grew.  
As international attention and advocacy grew, more and more organisations began 
conducting their own research on the ground. They uncovered a whole array of human rights 
violations in cobalt mines including forced child labour, lethal health hazards and lack of 
government protection for workers and illegal taxation by state officials92, which then became 
the premise of the international campaigns. Children from poor families are often recruited to the 
mines as they are easily exploited, often made to work long hours in conditions extremely 
hazardous to their health and safety, all the while getting underpaid. Humanitarian issues 
involving the exploitation of poor and vulnerable children is the perfect cause to garner 
widespread international sympathy. It was easy to place this as the face of the Congo war, where 
child recruitment is a common by-product of an unstable state that is unable to protect its citizens 
and provide viable alternatives. Additionally, as interest peaked on the violence in Congo, the 
emotional response it ignited caused attention to grow on the mining industry, the unfair 
conditions of trade for the miners and its link to the west. The trade itself is conducted informally 
with small marketplaces determining the going prices of each mineral daily, and therefore miners 
have no option but to accept the rate despite if it is below market value. 
There were four main approaches taken by advocacy efforts to place conflict minerals on 
the political agenda; education, pressure, responsibility sharing and environmental appeal. 
Groups sought to educate governments, consumers and companies alike about these relatively 
unknown minerals and their contribution to the perpetuation of conflict in the DRC. Once 
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informing the international communities about the issue, organisations were perfectly positioned 
to put pressure on the same three groups to make informed and conscientious decisions, as well 
as shaming governments and companies for knowingly and unknowingly trading with war 
criminals. Campaign representatives directly lobbied politicians, governments and corporations. 
Responsibility was shared out between these groups, persuading them revaluate their supply 
chains and trading regulations, while also encouraging individual consumers to boycott or hold 
electronic companies using these minerals accountable for the effects of their practices abroad. 
Fourthly, some European and Australian based NGO’s, decided to tackle the environmental and 
ecological consequences to ungoverned mining93. The majority of these campaigns targeted 
university students and young people in Western countries, who were encouraged to petition their 
campus heads and politicians to support conflict-free initiatives and laws. They achieved this by 
distributing information through various multimedia outlets, engaging celebrity endorsement and 
ultimately targeting young people, due to their “importance as consumers of electronic devices 
and their enthusiasm for action”94. 
During this conflict, there has been a rise in a new type of foreign accountability norm, 
which “considers it ‘normal’ for extractive industries to be held accountable for harmful practices 
abroad.”95 There has been a noticeable shift in global thinking, with responsibility being shared 
amongst all the shareholders and ethical consumerism taking over. Once DRC’s plight was 
adopted collectively we began discussing the cost-benefit assessment of mining, the players and 
the stakeholders involved in the whole process. Companies are now being held morally, 
politically and legally accountable for their activities and are being persecuted or shamed for any 
connection to illegal mining activity. With the sheer amount of US celebrities and athletes all 
rallying behind the cause and personally advocating for the campaigns, increased the influence 
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and popular opinion towards the issue directly leading to the development of the Dodd Frank 
Legislation. The widespread use of these minerals involves numerous different industries, and 
with major revenue at stake, the mining industry began working with governments and NGO’s 
soon after it was adopted into US law, by Obama’s administration in 2010. Coltan has now 
“become symbolic of how ordinary people on the other side of the world, through their 
consumption habits, are implicated in conflict and injustice”96 thousands of miles away, a 
downside to globalisation.  
Since Congo and its vast mineral reserves have been a topic of worldwide debate, the 
changing nature of the conflict has also influenced NGO strategies, which have adapted to this 
progression. During Michael Nest’s exploration on advocacy efforts governing coltan, he notes 
that there is a stark lack of initiatives focusing on upstream production, that is the mining of the 
mineral ores97. He justifies this by stating that NGO’s primarily “concentrate their efforts on 
trying to change corporate and consumer demand because this is where [they] have the most 
leverage and experience.”98 This observation uncovers a great hole in international advocacy 
efforts, as they seem to be bypassing the real problem in the Congo; local cleavages, state 
incapacity and including the voice of DRC miners during the formalisation process. This is a 
fundamental issue in global natural resource advocacy and management, as it is common for 
international efforts, while set out with good intentions, to miss the local context. Western 
organizations who were tasked with research made short trips to the Congo, primarily engaging 
with the government, businesses and other elites in the country. Overlooking the input of local 
experts, meant that the process of state-building and formalization is disruptive and incomplete 
as the whole community is not engaged. There is a noticeable gap between international efforts 
and localised grassroots efforts, which undermines the formalization process. The interaction 
between global and local initiatives needs to be more streamlined, in order to become more 
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effective and avoid unnecessary overlap. The Enough Project realising this, broadened its efforts 
in 2015 to tackle some of the underlying issues they discovered while conducting research over 
the last few years. Its focus moved away from solely emphasizing on minerals, towards 
understanding and strategizing to challenge the high corruption prevalent in Congolese society, 
believing that this and its link to violence is the real cause of conflict. 
Relevance 
In many Congolese economies, “artisanal mining makes important contributions to socio-
economic development by providing employment and injecting money directly into the local 
economy.”99 Henceforth a key livelihood strategy for many, demands a vigorous restructuring of 
the laws and regulations surrounding it; too many people depend on natural minerals for it to be 
left to its own devices and vulnerable to exploitative practices. Furthermore, with the exponential 
growth of the technology industry in recent years, there is even more urgency on establishing 
formal laws to govern the natural resource extraction. Each of the main minerals mined in the 
DRC have individually seen their limelight and relevance peak over the last few decades, and it 
appears as if now Cobalt is in the firing line. 
Uniquely, the importance of cobalt has only recently become significant, due to the 
electric vehicle revolution. The shift in car manufacturers towards electric vehicles (EV) has 
caused the demand for cobalt to sky rocket in recent years, as has the price which “has reportedly 
more than tripled in the past 18 months to more than $80,000 per metric ton”100. As of now, 
cobalt is not included under the umbrella of ‘conflict minerals’, but there are calls for it to be 
treated as such and predictions101 that it will soon be encompassed in the Dodd-Frank Act. But 
before this comes into action, there is uncertainty surrounding the future of the law and particular 
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negative consequences resulting from the US law which needs to be addressed in a local capacity 
before introducing other metals to the regulation, which will be discussed in the next section. 
 
Chapter 5: A Critical Analysis of Dodd-Frank 
 
In recent times, the “international debate on the ongoing crisis in the East of the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo has concentrated on the presumed link between the 
continuation of conflict and the continuation of mineral exports.”102 Advocacy campaigns 
spearheaded by the Enough Project and The Global Witness, first highlighted the link between 
western consumerism and the prolonging and financing of Congo’s conflict. The campaigns 
focused on technological advances which have and are developing and an exponential rate, while 
also bringing up uncomfortable questions on the role of Western accountability. 
The campaigns were hugely successful throughout 2009, garnering wide international 
attention and soon many advocates, politicians and consumers themselves, were calling for 
enforceable laws and standards to combat the violence millions of miles away. It is because of 
this advocacy-led effort, the Obama administration began developing and including the notion 
of ‘conflict minerals’ in their Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. The 
law, named one of “the most far reaching Wall Street reform in history”103 was in part aimed to 
ensure that a financial crisis like that experienced in the autumn of 2008, is never felt again. The 
act sought to reform and create a more stable US financial sector, by regulating new and existing 
financial firms, as well as keeping a tighter control on Wall Street, and holding them more 
accountable104. Supporters of the law lobbied that it would weaken militia groups and armed 
actors in the DRC as companies would have to ensure and prove that their minerals are sourced 
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without any armed actor involvement. Therefore, this increased policing and attention to Congo’s 
mines would be expected to eventually cut off the rebel’s revenue generated by mining, as stricter 
monitoring of the minerals would be in place, limiting the potential for their profits. 
Thus, the Dodd-Frank Act was born and signed into action by Obama on July 21st, 2010. 
Out of its entirety, the final few pages focus on the use of conflict minerals and responsible 
sourcing of them. The administration acknowledged that many minerals originating from and 
being sourced in the Democratic Republic of Congo, are being exploited and “helping to finance 
conflict characterized by extreme levels of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the 
Congo”105. The law requires US stock listed companies that use or may have reason to use 
conflict minerals “necessary to the functionality or production of their goods”106, to disclose 
information surrounding where their minerals are sourced from, and to make conscious efforts 
to ensure that they are mined without involving armed actors or militia. The term ‘conflict 
minerals’ is defined by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to encompass the 3T’s 
(tin, tantalum and tungsten) and the mining of gold: 
 columbite-tantalite, also known as coltan (the metal ore from which 
tantalum is extracted); cassiterite (the metal ore from which tin is 
extracted); gold; wolframite (the metal ore from which tungsten is 
extracted); or their derivatives; or any other mineral or its derivatives 
determined by the Secretary of State to be financing conflict in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo or an adjoining country107.  
 
The Obama administration premised the law on publicly ‘naming and shaming’ 
companies that use conflict minerals, believing that this would urge them to clean up their supply 
chain for fear of losing global reputation and consumer loyalty. Companies implicated are 
expected to file various forms and paperwork to the SEC, compile evidence to support their 
‘conflict free’ claim, as well as publishing an annual ‘Conflict Minerals Report’, accessible to 
the public. In order to comply with these new regulations, companies were expected to examine 
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their supply chains, pin pointing the source of the various minerals and reporting their findings 
publicly. 
Section 1502 covers Democratic Republic of Congo and the surrounding sub-region 
which presently includes the nation states of Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Congo, 
Malawi, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia108. These countries are included 
in the law, due to their geographical location and connection to the illegal trafficking and 
plundering of the minerals sourced from Congo. Due to this broad stipulation, the law was 
expected to affect a whole variety of differing industries including but not limited to technology, 
electronics and communications, aerospace, automobiles, jewellery, healthcare and 
manufacturing109. For the purpose of this paper, I will be explicitly focusing on the technology 
and electronic industry and its role in the battle for conflict-free mineral extraction. This is 
because, as mentioned in the previous section, the rise of Congo’s mineral importance goes hand 
in hand with the increased worldwide technological advancement. They are becoming an 
essential component of modern day technological devices and their significance is only expected 
to grow in the future. 
The announcement of the Dodd-Frank Act, was met with many mixed attitudes and 
opinions amongst its stakeholders. Many championed the bold move, including former U.S. 
Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton who praised the law saying that: 
 
 “they do bring together labor, civil society, and business to create 
the broadest possible consensus behind them. This is truly the work 
of a global policy network in action”110 
 
 
Policy makers, business experts and advocates alike saw the SEC’s regulations as a step 
in the right direction, but then the question became one of enforcement and implementation. 
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Initial reservations to the law came from lobbyists and local activists, who were concerned that 
the new law would in fact create a de facto ban as businesses could easily decide to boycott 
Congo and source elsewhere. Moreover, with due diligence standards relatively lenient in the 
past, adherence to the new law was predicted to be a very long and expensive procedure for the 
U.S. businesses involved. The National Association of Manufacturers initially estimated 
“compliance costs [to] fall between $9 billion and $16 billion, which are significantly higher than 
the SEC estimate of $71 million.”111 Some suggested that the law would be a positive 
development as it forces those profiting from mining activities to bear the costs of trade, while 
also encouraging local miners and armed factions to participate in trade without violence. 
Supporters viewed it as an important step in the right direction to help formalise the mining 
industry of Eastern Congo. 
However, despite the numerous good intentions behind Dodd-Frank, the law itself has 
been proven to fall short and a little too optimistic. After its implementation in 2012, it has “set 
off a chain of events that has propelled millions of miners and their families deeper into 
poverty”112. There have been many accounts of unplanned negative consequences affecting local 
artisanal miners on the ground, attributed to the law being based on a partial analysis of the 
dynamics of conflict in Congo. The very law that was developed and implemented to protect 
poor Congolese mineworkers and locals, has backfired and is in fact hindering the process of 
legitimizing the entire sector. The initial announcement of the law pressured Congolese 
President, Joseph Kabila, to take action in his own country to show his support and compliance 
of the cause. He declared a Congolese-imposed export ban on minerals between September 2010 
and March 2011, which caused detrimental effects on the local population who were ill prepared 
for an embargo, let alone a self-inflicted one. Although the legislation did not explicitly call for 
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an export ban, the Congolese government no doubt, felt the pressure and that they needed to 
respond to show support and aid in the implementation of the law.   
The repercussions from the law has had a detrimental effect on the DRC. Once the official 
Congo-state led embargo was lifted, the Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition (EICC) in the 
US imposed a de facto embargo113, refusing to buy minerals from the Congo that have not been 
tagged or traced114. While many support the spirit of the Dodd-Frank legislation, the subsequent 
bans have caused job losses, loss of livelihood strategies and have instead benefitted select 
military elites in the Kivus region. The World Bank estimates115 that before Dodd Frank, 
approximately 16% of the country relied on artisanal mining in some way, after implementation 
the miners were stuck with loss of jobs, no support or other alternatives. Ironically, the creuseurs 
are instead now more susceptible to joining an armed group as a result116. Foreign companies 
have avoided buying the minerals, leading to a drop in global price of minerals and miners lack 
other options for labour and money. The Eastern provinces of DRC have been notorious for 
having very little state authority or presence, which remained the case after the law came into 
effect and so permitting human rights violations to continue despite this improvement. 
Nicknamed ‘Loi Obama’ - Obama’s Law117 in the region, its adoption soon allowed the little to 
none governance to benefit many army officials, who took over and stayed in control of the 
mines. While in some areas, militia men did abandon their hold on some of the mines, in many 
other areas the army seized control. They used their authority to force local diggers out of many 
informal mining sites, stepping in to make money themselves by controlling and taxing miners 
that extract at their location. 
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The swift execution of the ban left many exporters with large amounts of mineral stock 
already mined and with no way of selling. Mineral exporting did not cease, however. Officers 
were able to get around the embargo by bribing, smuggling and transporting the untagged 
minerals out of the country, and selling them through Rwandan and Ugandan markets, where 
there was no ban. Bribery, fraud and corruption amongst the region has increased as a result of 
the law, directly helping Congolese army men and some militia groups to profit. These groups 
can capitalise as they have the relevant authority and networks in place to continue mining and 
profiteering while the embargo was in place. “Adjoining countries also knowingly fuel[ed] the 
crisis by exporting products originating within the borders of their neighbours”118, thus providing 
armed groups with relatively secure transport routes and access to the global market to sell the 
DRC tainted products. Paradoxically it has pushed the very trade it wished to regulate 
underground, making it harder to trace and monitor. In places where militia have abandoned 
mines for revenue, they have often switched to selling other commodities such as palm oil and 
charcoal for income. 
An array of international and local initiatives aimed at decriminalise the mining sector in 
DRC were already in progress before the embargo, which we will discuss in the next chapter. 
Yet, due to lack of funding from their mineral exports, they have now slowed down their efforts 
and been rendered ineffective as a result of Section 1502. Another unforeseen consequence of 
the ban left some remote mining areas and communities severely worse off. The majority of the 
local population in these zones relied heavily on aircrafts, which routinely flew in with goods to 
serve the local population and flew out with mineral exports. Without any minerals to pick up 
the planes decreased in frequency, and left many areas deprived of food and goods essential for 
survival. Critiques of Dodd-Frank were also quick to highlight after adoption, that the law itself 
is very loose and non-binding to be truly effective. Legal definitions as stated in Section 
1502(e)(4) of the Act is accused of being too narrow, in fact providing a substantial loophole for 
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mining and technology companies who use cobalt instead of either of the 3TGs. Cobalt is not 
included in the limited definition as it was not initially thought to be funding wars and “currently, 
no country legally requires companies to publicly report on their cobalt supply chains.”119 Yet, 
the importance of cobalt has increased dramatically in the last few years and is expected to 
continue rising, with special thanks to the advancement and demand of electric vehicles. Without 
proper regulation expanding to include Cobalt, it is likely that exploitation and abuses concerned 
with artisanal mining of the mineral will increase exponentially as predicted global demand and 
price increases. 
The law as of now, hinges on the punishment of a tarnished global reputation for those 
companies that do not comply. There is no penalty or price facing public U.S. companies who 
continue to engage in using conflict minerals, except public shaming. To remedy this, the law 
could incorporate financial consequences to charge companies that fail to conform, while 
enlisting the help of local nongovernmental organizations to help monitor and whistle blow on 
those that continue to engage in shady activity. This would give companies more of an incentive 
to conduct due diligence on their supply chains, but it is still likely to be insufficient to prevent 
conflict reoccurring on the ground and allow conditions to be stable enough to establish a secure 
market for minerals. Another limitation of the legislation, is that it only confronts companies at 
the end of the supply chain, whereas a “coordinated pressure along the entire illicit value chain 
of conflict minerals would be more effective than a standalone intervention aimed solely at the 
extractive stage.”120 Governance should be streamlined across all levels of mining process, with 
all stakeholders and intermediaries of the mineral supply chain from the DRC held accountable 
for their actions and they should be prepared to do their part in eradicating mineral-led conflicts.  
Furthermore, adherence to the current law is restricted to just U.S. public companies, 
which although is a good start, is not enough to tackle such a large scale intercontinental problem. 
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The Chinese mining and smelting market has somewhat capitalised on this, by offering a 
substitute market during the provisional trade embargo. While this does help generate little 
money for the local miners, with limited alternatives they are typically forced to accept extremely 
unfair prices. The “lack of a binding global due diligence regime leaves a gap in the fight to end 
the crisis”121, and all other attempts to remedy the situation is likely to fail if we do not have a 
unified solution. 
It is clear now, that Dodd-Frank was developed and implemented too prematurely in 
response to pressures from global advocate groups, and without consulting local experts to fully 
comprehend the wider implications. Many academics and experts alike complain that the 
fundamental reason as to why Obama’s law has not seen the desired effects, is because it does 
not tackle or even begin to tackle the underlying causes of the conflict in the DRC. While the 
legislation had honourable intentions, by the time former president Obama signed the law, “the 
conflict had moved into a different phase”122. Contrary to popular western beliefs, the conflict in 
the Congo is largely driven by local grievances over land and ethnicity, passed down from the 
colonial period. These tensions, largely neglected by the domestic and international policy 
agenda, has historically held the capacity to develop into full blown war, often pulling in 
involvement from regional actors. The lack of strong governance and political will by the current 
Congolese president, has aided the violence as the affected regions are riddled with poor and 
unenforceable rule of law. With such a large array of stakeholders, militia groups and local 
authorities, each with their own agendas tangled in the mess of conflict minerals, it seems far-
fetched and naïve of the international community to believe that enforcing malleable laws would 
be the ultimate solution. Henceforth, the international and regional dynamics of the mineral trade, 
in conjunction with the known historical tensions between DRC and its neighbours, is reason 
enough for there to be a more structured global strategy.  
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Consequently, the continuous reality of the issue, the cost (both national and 
internationally) and the challenges being faced in eastern Congo regarding its regulation, has 
caused the current US government to re-consider a repeal. While Dodd-Frank has succeeded in 
increasing global awareness to the humanitarian crisis and raising really topical questions about 
the governance and responsibility surrounding conflict minerals, there are still few key 
ingredients missing from helping to achieve its purpose. An ongoing conflict of this magnitude 
and difficulty, requires a unified response both sub-regionally and internationally. Nation heads 
from the neighbouring countries of Congo need to work together with the African Union (AU) 
and with local NGO’s on the ground to first solve the outbreaks of violence via a bottom up 
approach. There is a desperate need in eastern Congo to establish safe and secure conditions, 
which can be achieved by forming strong institutions in conjunction with local authorities and 
chiefs to uphold the rule of law. Only once the conditions locally, domestically and regionally 
are stable, can the mining sector be expected to thrive and monitored to remain violence free. 
 
Chapter 6: Other efforts to formalising the mining sector and tackle mining abuses  
 
The story of Congo’s minerals has been a fairly turbulent affair, with ever changing 
policies and strategies created to tackle the various stages of the supply chain. With the rise in 
foreign accountability, international laws and treaties regarding conflict minerals are not the only 
response to worldwide calls for more oversight in the mineral trade in the DRC. There have been 
many other attempts to mitigate the impact of international corporations in poorer countries, 
schemes to trace and track resources before leaving the country and international standards 
enforced to reassure potential consumers that their products are conflict-free. Various bodies and 
groups have rallied together and also independently, in attempts to help formalise the mining 
industry in the Congo. There have been negotiations and talks between the Congolese state and 
its neighbouring governments, which has led to the creation of regional bodies and initiatives 
pledging to jointly tackle the governance of natural resources mined in the encompassed territory. 
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I will analyse and examine a few of these strategies in the international, regional and local 
context, as well as their subsequent impact on the mining sector of the DRC.  
The following tables are a collection of the past, current and ongoing laws and treaties 
enacted by international, regional and domestic governments: 
Table 2. International & Regional Treaties and Laws Affecting Mining and the DRC 
 
Treaty / Law 
Countries/Territories 
Affected 
Date 
Created 
Date 
Signed 
Implementation/Adoption 
Date in DRC 
Legally 
Binding? 
International 
     
Geneva Convention 
- 1977 Additional 
Protocol I and II 
196 State parties 
- 168 State Parties, 3 
State Signatories 
1949 
- 1977 
1961 
-1982 
1961 
-2002 
Yes 
International 
Covenant for Civil 
and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) 
74 Signatories, 169 
State Parties 
1966 - 1976 - Accession Date Yes 
International 
Covenant for 
Economic, Social, 
and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR) 
71 Signatories, 166 
State Parties 
1966 - 1976 - Accession Date Yes 
Convention of the 
Elimination of All 
Forms of 
Discrimination 
Against Women 
(CEDAW) 
99 Signatories, 189 
State Parties 
1979 1980 1986 (DRC Ratified) Yes 
Convention Against 
Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading 
Treatment or 
Punishment (CAT) 
83 Signatories, 162 
State Parties 
1984 - 
1996 - Accession Date 
 
Protocol signed 2010 
Yes 
Convention of the 
Rights of the Child 
140 Signatories, 196 
State Parties 
1989 1990 1990 (DRC Ratified) Yes 
UNESCO 104 
EX/3.3 Procedure 
for the Protection of 
Human Rights 
UNESCO members 1978 1978 1978 Yes 
Section 1502 Dodd 
Frank 
US 2010 2010 2012 - 2017 No 
Conflict Minerals 
Regulation 
EU 2017 2017 2021 (expected) Yes 
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Table 3. Failed Legal Attempts 
 
Failed attempts   
Treaty / Law Country Affected Date - Dismissed 
Bill C-486 the Conflict Minerals Act Canada 2014 
 
Table 4. Regional Treaties and Laws Affecting Mining and the DRC 
 
Treaty / Law 
Countries/Territories 
Affected 
Date 
Created 
Date 
Signed 
Implementation/Adoption 
Date in DRC 
Legally 
Binding? 
Regional 
     
The African Charter 
on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights 
(Banjul Charter) 
All 53 AU members 1987 1987 1987 (DRC joined) Yes 
Protocol to above 
24 signatories, 25 
unratified AU 
members 
1998 1999 -currently unratified Yes 
Constitutive Act of 
the African Union 
All 53 AU members 2000 2001 2002 Yes 
Protocol to the 
African Charter on 
Human and Peoples' 
Rights on the Rights 
of Women in Africa 
36 signatories, 15 
unratified AU 
members 
2003 2003 2008 Yes 
Protocol on the Fight 
against the Illegal 
Exploitation of 
Natural Resources 
ICGLR Members 2006 2006 2006 Yes 
Pact on Security, 
Stability and 
Development in 
Great Lakes Region 
ICGLR Members 2006 2006 2008 Yes 
Regional Initiative 
against the Illegal 
Exploitation of 
Natural Resources 
(RINR) 
Members of 
International 
Conference of the 
Great Lakes Region 
(ICGLR) 
2009 2010 2010 Yes 
Suspension of all 
artisanal Mining 
Activities 
DRC 2010 - Sept 2010- March 2011 Yes 
Lusaka Declaration 
of the ICGLR Special 
Summit to Fight 
Illegal Exploitation 
of Natural Resources 
in the Great Lakes 
Region 
ICGLR Members 2010 2010 2010 Yes 
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Table 5. Domestic Treaties and Laws Affecting Mining and the DRC 
 
Treaty / Law 
Countries/Territories 
Affected 
Date 
Created 
Date 
Signed 
Implementation/Adoption 
Date in DRC 
Legally 
Binding? 
DRC’s Constitution: 
• Human Rights 
Principles 
• Labour & Forced 
Labour Rights 
DRC 1960 
2006 - 
Revised 
2006 Yes 
Labour Code DRC 2002 2002 2002 Yes 
Congolese Mining Code DRC 2002 2002 2003 Yes 
Mining Regulations DRC 2003 2003 2003 Yes 
The National Child Protection 
Code 
DRC 2009 2009 2009 Yes 
Revised Mining Code 2017 DRC 2018 - 
Remains unsigned by 
President 
Yes 
 
Table 6. Organisations and Initiatives aimed at Formalising the Mining Sector in the DRC 
and reducing the violence 
 
Organisation Initiative Date Founded Countries 
Affected 
Minerals 
Included 
Binding 
Human Rights Watch 
and Congo Research 
Group 
Kivu Security Tracker 2017 DRC - - 
World Gold Council 
and Jewellers 
Association 
Conflict-Free Gold 
Standard 
2012 
 
Implementation 
- 2013 
WGC 
Members 
Gold Yes 
OECD 
Due Diligence Guidance 
for Responsible Supply 
Chains of Minerals from 
Conflict-Affected and 
High-Risk Areas 
2013 
Countries 
that are 
“Conflict-
Affected 
and High-
Risk Areas” 
3TG 
No 
UN Guiding Principles for 
Business and Human 
Rights 
2011 Signatories 
of the 
Geneva 
Convention 
- 
No 
OECD and ICGLR 
Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) 2010 
G8 and 
ICGLR 
members 
3TG 
 
OECD and CCCMC 
Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) 
2014 
China 3TG Yes 
CCCMC 
Chinese Due Diligence 
Guidelines for Responsible 
Mineral Supply Chains 
2015 
China - No 
CCCMC 
Guidelines for Social 
Responsibility Outbound 
Mining Investment 
2014 
China - No 
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Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative 
(EITI)  
The EITI Standard 2013 
51 EITI 
countries 
- Yes 
US Electronic Industry 
Citizenship Coalition 
(EICC) and the Global 
e-Sustainability 
Initiative (GeSi) 
Conflict-Free Smelter 
(CFS) - Conflict-Free 
Sourcing Initiative = 
Responsible Minerals 
Initiative  
2011 
Electronic 
and 
Technology 
Companies 
Globally 
3TG Yes 
German Federal 
Institute for 
Geosciences and 
Natural Resources’ 
(BGR) 
National Certification 
System in DR Congo 
& Introducing CTC to 
DRC 
2008 DRC 3TG - 
International Tin 
Research Institute 
(ITRI) 
Traceability System 
(iTSCi) 
2010 
Global 
Companies 
sourcing 
Tin 
Tin - 
World Bank and DRC 
gov- Pact Inc. 
PROMINES 2010 DRC  - 
MONUSCO and 
Congolese 
Government 
UN est.  
Mineral Trading Centre 
2010 DRC 3TG - 
Congolese State STAREC 
2009-2012 
2015 - new 
plan  
DRC - - 
 
 
Legal Mechanisms 
 
 
International 
 
The first wave of international liability, built upon the obligations set out in the 2011 UN 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights123 (UNGPs). These guidelines first set out the 
responsibility of global companies to ensure that when the state fails or is unwilling, human rights 
are respected during their operations. Companies are widely expected to warrant that their 
business practices do not intentionally or unintentionally cause, contribute to, or benefit from 
armed conflict or human rights abuses, yet the principles in itself are unbinding. They merely 
offer clarification on the “implications of relevant provisions of existing international human 
rights standards”124, deriving from states’ existing responsibilities under international law. This, 
                                                 
123 United Nations (2011). Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. 
124 Aronson, D. (2011). How Congress Devastated Congo. The New York Times. Pp.8 
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in conjunction with the US implementation of Section 1502 prompted the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to create the ‘Due Diligence Guidance for 
Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas’125 in 2013. 
A practical guide detailing a five-step process on how such due diligence should be carried out 
effectively. While the OECD guide is also not legally binding, it does provide direction on how 
operations can be conducted in accordance with the UNGPs. It was approved by all 34 OECD 
Member states, 9 non-OECD states and 11 members of the International Conference on the Great 
Lakes (ICGLR)126.  
In March 2013, Canada prompted by America’s legal stance against conflict minerals 
began discussing introducing Bill C-486, a similar legislation to Dodd-Frank targeting the 3TGs 
originating from DRC and its neighbouring countries. However, this was defeated in parliament 
in 2014 and did not become law. In October 2014, the OECD signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding with the Chinese Chamber of Commerce of Metals, Minerals & Chemicals 
Importers & Exporters127 (CCCMC), to endorse the OECD guidelines in China. The CCCMC, 
in 2015 launched their own due diligence guidelines128 for responsible mineral supply chains, in 
accordance with the OECD and consulting industry specialists. Additionally, the European Union 
is also currently considering implementing laws requiring OECD guidance compliance for 
European companies dealing with 3Ts and Gold. This is expected to come into effect in 2021. 
 
Regional 
 
Amidst the backdrop of Congo’s second war, reports of increased child recruitment into 
the conflict, widespread rape and smuggling of natural resources to finance and prolong the war, 
it was clear that there was a need for a unified approach. The cross-border complexity of the issue 
                                                 
125 OECD (2013), OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals 
from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas: Second Edition. 
126 Amnesty International (2016). This is What We Die For. Pp.44 
127 Ibid. Pp.44 
128 Chinese Chamber of Commerce of Metals, Minerals & Chemicals Importers & Exporters 
(2015). Chinese Due Diligence Guidelines for Responsible Mineral Supply Chains 
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and destabilising informality of the trade, prompted the establishment of the International 
Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) in 2004. The ICGLR is now the “highest level 
regional organisation addressing conflict minerals and security issues in eastern DRC”129 and its 
members includes the African governments of Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, 
Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda 
and Zambia.  
The intergovernmental group signed the ‘Pact of Nairobi’ in 2006, to provide a legal 
framework governing Security, Stability and Development in the region and to promote relations 
between its signatories. They reconfirmed their commitment to the cause four years later, by 
launching the ‘Regional Initiative against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources’ (RINR) 
in 2010, to track the chain of custody of the 3TGs. Commonly referred to as the Lusaka 
Declaration, the summit created a comprehensive approach to restricting the trade of illegally 
mined natural resources, and financing of armed actors. The initiative not only encourages 
dialogue between member states on the matter, it also sets out a set of six strategies to legalise 
their certification mechanism and synchronise their independent approaches in line with other 
international regulations already in place. The six tools are: 
1. Regional Certification Mechanism (RCM) for cassiterite, 
wolframite, coltan and gold  
2. Harmonization of national legislation  
3. Formalization of the artisanal mining sector  
4. A regional database on mineral flows  
5. Promotion of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
(EITI)  
6. A whistle-blowing mechanism130 
 
The tools are aimed at increasing transparency and implementation of the RCM requires 
a close supervision and regional tracking of the minerals from mine to site of export via the 
ICGLR database. This requires regular third-party audits, conducted independently of 
                                                 
129Rothenberg, D. and Radley, B. (2014). "We Miners Take Our Lives in Our Hands Save 
Nothing and Believe Only in Luck": The Lived Experience of Human Rights and Labor 
Violations in Select Artisanal Mining Sites in North and South Kivu. Pp.25 
130 Ibid. Pp.26 
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governments, companies and civil society. The implementation of these processes is still 
undergoing relative evaluations and relevant bodies are still being established. However, progress 
has been made. In 2011 a certification manual was approved and adopted by member states, and 
a regional Audit Committee was founded in 2012, with the prominent heads involving 
individuals from Rwanda, Kenya and the DRC. The regional certification mechanism is in place 
and also, there is currently a test version of the database operating, “which has already started to 
gather data on the production and exports of selected natural resources”131. 
A regional strategy or harmonisation of policies and national legislations between the 
Congo and its neighbouring states is an imperative foundation for a successful approach to 
mitigating conflict minerals, as trade is so interwoven between the various countries that stand-
alone approaches will not be enough. The ICGLR recognises this and openly admits that a “key 
problem of this predicament is the missing linkage between the supply chain of natural resource 
and the formal economy of the ICGLR Member States.”132 The regional certification mechanism 
was constructed to alleviate this, it was crafted to be compatible with other available mechanisms 
governing mineral resources (ITRI/iTSCI, BGR/CTC and OECD guidelines) and places each 
member state liable for its implementation. 
Local 
Mining Code 2002 and 2003 
The heightened participation of citizens in Congo’s artisanal mining industry during the 
coltan boom, pushed policy makers in the country to reassess the current laws governing the 
trade. With little formal and enforceable rules in place until the early 2000’s, most artisanal 
mining was deemed illegal. Congo’s government then introduced a set of mining codes in 2002, 
specifically aimed at legalising the trade, offering protections to those working in the industry 
and outlining health and safety guidelines for safe practices. Unregulated mining was a dangerous 
                                                 
131 Icglr.org. (2018). RINR. 
132 Icglr.org. (2018). Natural Resources. 
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trade, mines were often handcrafted and excavated by local creuseurs who were unaware of the 
life-threatening dangers associated with unplanned mining tunnels and the hazardous fumes they 
could be exposed to during their work. As aforementioned, the state created ‘artisanal 
exploitation zones’ (AEZ’s) in areas which the site is not suited for industrial mining, enabling 
ASM to be acceptable. 
The 2002 Mining code was long overdue in the DRC, finally recognising and formalising 
the ASM sector. The code and constitution declare that the state is the owner of all mineral 
resources in the DRC, but they can grant private parties and individuals the rights to exploit the 
resources. The enforcement of the code now required miners to obtain authorisation from the 
state’s Ministry of Mines via a ‘carte d’exploitant artisnal’. Miners are issued permits to allow 
them to continue legally mining and also outlines the permissible sites where they can continue 
extracting ores. The aim was to relaunch the industrial mining sector following the two Congo 
Wars of 1996-2003, opening it up to foreign investors and generating revenue for the state. 
Although this was one of the first attempts to officially govern and implement rules on ASM, 
enforceability was another issue in itself. The laws became adopted more like guidelines and 
were rarely seen to be enforced with authority. Additionally, some of the legal aspects of the 
code are at odds with local rules and competing powers, as the question of who holds the 
jurisdiction is blurry. Mining agents, state authorities and local chiefs all hold some say over land 
and mining activities, yet when there are conflict rights to consent, the code makes it unclear as 
to who ultimately holds the power. 
Consequently, in 2003 an update and revision to the former mining regulations were 
introduced. Its aim was to build upon the 2002 code, by providing rules to define the legal 
management of mining activities in the DRC, to offer clarification for the protections and rights 
of miners as well as the role of the state. The new policies outline the parameters of mining 
activities and how waste and other negative externalities from the profession can be minimised. 
The updated mining regulation incorporated information on environmental standards and 
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highlighted the main administrative entities in charge of mining activities in Congo; these are the 
Congolese government, Ministry of Mines and the Department in Charge of the Protection of the 
Mining Environment.  
While these legislations do a good job of explaining mining rights and establishing rules 
for ASM, it did little to benefit the workers themselves. The quantity of approved AEZ sites were 
limited and are not enough to meet current mining demands, which causes the majority of miners 
to continue operating ‘illegally’. Bureaucratic red tape makes opening new AEZ sites equally as 
difficult as it necessitates the approval of at least three differing bodies. The requirement of 
approval for ASM employees, made it difficult for those already engaging in the trade to formally 
enter the market. Usually permits and paperwork is recognised and approved only in Kinshasa, 
which is time consuming and tedious for miners to travel to, as they often reside in the Eastern 
provinces near secluded mining sites. Moreover, while it was necessary to establish a legal 
framework to govern ASM activities, the new laws did little to combat pre-existing antagonisms 
related to mining, land rights and forced displacement. Currently, artisanal and small-scale 
miners have no property rights under DRC mining laws, they are only permitted to mine if they 
pay a small fee to the state. Additionally, the rules do not govern mining deals already in place, 
during the mineral boom many mining companies “signed ‘conventions’ with the DRC 
government that exist outside of the tax and legal structure.”133  
Presently, a new and updated set of mining codes are being discussed, following calls by 
local NGO’s and civil society to rework the laws promoting Congolese interests. However, it is 
facing strong opposition from large multinational mining corporations who are against the 
proposal of a tax increase. In 2015, a set of amendments were submitted to parliament suggesting 
a 5% tax increase on profits, increasing the government’s stake in new mining projects from 5% 
to 10% and increasing the royalties from copper and cobalt to 3.5% from 2%134. These were 
                                                 
133 Radley, B. (2017). The DRC is revisiting its mining code. Why reform is long overdue. The 
Conversation. 
134 Ibid. 
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dropped due to an unexpected decline in commodity prices, but it is feared that the financials 
surrounding the natural resource will overpower the debate and urgency of more pressing 
matters. 
Strengthening Government Bodies and Regulating Institutions for mining oversight 
In response to the expansion of the mining sector in Congo, the DRC has attempted to 
create institutions and strengthen existing mandates for better oversight over the industry. The 
Congo’s main mining authority is the Ministry of Mines, headed by Martin Kabwelulu as 
Minister of Mines. It has the task of supervising mining activities at the national level and is 
responsible for ensuring overall management of the ASM sector, with the authority to determine 
AEZ sites. It has two technical services, the Technical Unit for Coordination and Planning of 
Mining (CTCPM) and The Service for Assistance and Organization of Artisanal and Small-Scale 
Mining (SAESSCAM) to serve ASM employees. The DRC has a number of agencies to 
monitoring the mining sector: 
• National Minister of Mines 
• Provincial Authority of Mines 
• The Geology Directorate 
• Directorate of Mines 
• Department in charge of the Protection of the mining Environment 
 
However, these lack “the necessary financial and human resources to successfully 
perform its functions,”135 there is frequent unnecessary duplication and overlapping of roles 
between the agencies, and also it is unclear as to the hierarchy of power amongst these various 
institutions. While attempts by the Congo state to formalize the industry have been somewhat 
commendable, there is constant incoordination between the various bodies leading to inefficiency 
and ineffectiveness. The constant failure of these regulatory groups to work together has become 
more of a hinderance to miners on the ground rather than encouraging them to conduct their 
activities legally. Furthermore, the lack of funding, logistical or technical capacity of these 
                                                 
135 Geenen, S. (2012). A dangerous bet: The challenges of formalizing artisanal mining in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo. Resources Policy. Pp.326 
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structures to fulfil their mandate, fosters conditions making them vulnerable to corruption. Often 
agents are underpaid making them susceptible to accepting bribes, and also, they are only 
mandated to oversee the AEZ zones, despite most miners conducting their trade outside these 
areas.  
The biggest barrier to strengthening the mining industry is corruption and bribery, which 
is rampant and encouraged throughout Congo. Historically, underhanded dealings are the way 
business has been conducted for generations in the DRC, often at the hands of governmental 
officers or those in high levels of authority. This poses a great conflict of interest, as individual 
pursuits have typically tended to trump the needs of the citizens and elites have abused their 
power for personal enrichment. Examining President Kabila’s personal assets and family links 
to mining activities is a great indication of how fair and transparent natural resource governance 
may not be top of the agenda for the Congolese state. Research conducted by Congo Research 
Group (CRG) shows that the majority of the presidential family, including Kabila’s siblings, have 
ties to over 80 companies and businesses within the Congo and overseas.136 When elites have a 
stake in various companies, it makes it easier for them to pursue their own agenda over the 
nations. This is evident by the leniency shown to Kabila’s sister, which is rumored that “Congo’s 
Ministry of Mines has granted a company controlled by the president’s sister, Jaynet Kabila, 
more mining permits than allowed under the country’s mining code”137. The preferential 
treatment granted to those close to the President can viewed as an extension of the selective and 
kleptocratic practices constructed under Mobutu’s reign to finance his personal fortune, which 
has been mimicked and adopted by the elites that are now in power.  
In attempts to overcome Congo’s lack of state capacity and political will, international 
bodies such as the MONUSCO (Mission de l'Organisation des Nations unies pour la stabilisation 
                                                 
136 Kavanagh, M. and McCarey, D. (2017). All the President's Wealth: The Kabila Family 
Business. 
137Congo Research Group & Pulitzer Center (2017). All the President's Wealth. The Kabila 
Family Business. Pp.2 
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en République démocratique du Congo), the UN’s peacekeeping mission in Congo, has sought 
to implement independently controlled UN Mineral Trading Centres. Their hopes are that their 
presence along key transportation routes and trading hubs, will deter any rebels seeking to profit 
from the trade138, thereby breaking the link of minerals to armed violence.  
Nevertheless, it is clear that thus far, the efforts made by the government of the DRC to 
protect its citizens from human rights abuses is not enough. All states under international human 
rights law have a responsibility to protect the world from human rights abuses, but in the Congo, 
there are still not enough safeguards in place to defend artisanal miners from mining associated 
health and safety risks as well as exploitation.  
 
Industry Driven Initiatives 
 
Due Diligence 
 
With increased international media attention on the matter, some technology companies 
and industry heads have deemed it fit to take the matter and responsibility into their own hands. 
Apple Inc. has recently reported139 that it wishes to purchase cobalt straight from the source; 
cutting out the middle men and buying directly from miners in Congo. This marks a huge chain 
in technological company responsibility as the company previously left the purchase of cobalt to 
the companies that built its batteries. If this drive has come from apple’s commitment to corporate 
social responsibility is unclear, but currently in terms of cobalt supply, we “are in a supply-
demand imbalance140”. There are enough resources laying underground in the DRC, but 
production by artisanal miners is not enough to meet the current demand. “The iPhone maker is 
one of the world’s largest end users of cobalt for the batteries in its gadgets”141, but with the rise 
                                                 
138 Global Witness (2011). Congo's Minerals Trade in the Balance: Opportunities and 
Obstacles to demilitarisation. Pp.12 
139 Farchy, J. and Gurman, M. (2018). Apple in Talks to Buy Cobalt Directly From 
Miners. Bloomberg 
140 Mell, T as cited in Chutel, L. (2018). Apple wants to buy cobalt directly from miners, in a 
country where the middleman is in charge. 
141 Farchy, J. and Gurman, M. (2018). Apple in Talks to Buy Cobalt Directly From 
Miners. Bloomberg. 
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of electric vehicles pending, there is a threat on global supplies. Many large car manufacturers 
are hurrying to secure long-term cobalt contracts, to ensure that their supplies are maintained in 
the future.  
The drive for companies and industries to accept some responsibility and trace mineral 
origins have largely come from their consumers. Global advocacy and campaigning has made 
international consumers feel guilty about not being aware of how their spending habits can cause 
inadvertent damage abroad, and therefore has altered their preferences towards goods that are 
and can be proven to be more ethically sourced. In order to earn and maintain trust of their peers, 
industry heads and businesses alike have strived to conduct due diligence on the origins of the 
materials used in their products as well as making this information freely available to their peers. 
I will now examine a few of the leading initiatives currently in place to establish honourable 
mining extractive practises. 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiatives (EITI) 
 
The need for international transparency and multi-stake holder governance within the 
natural resource sector, led to the creation of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
(EITI) in 2002. It “sets a standard for transparency requiring its participants to disclose revenues 
generated in oil, gas and mining,”142 and is applicable to both government and company revenue 
generated by payments from those in the supply chain of these respective industries, as well as 
revenue received by the state from the industries themselves. The main aim of this project was 
to “promote transparency, good governance, and civil society participation and accountability 
within different extractive industries”143. It sought to eliminate the scope for corruption amongst 
high ranking officials and strengthen faith in governance by encouraging the availability of 
                                                 
142 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (2013). Special report on the “The 
ICGLR Regional Initiative against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources (RINR) and 
other Certification Mechanisms in the Great Lakes Region: Lessons Learned and Best 
practices”. Pp.36 
143 SAIIA (2018). The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative and Africa's Mineral 
Governance Regime. Occasional Paper 266. Pp.7 
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information regarding the financials of the state and extractive industries. The EITI was 
developed by a partnership between an array of governments, companies, NGOs, civil society 
groups, investors and international organisations. The standard is upheld by an International EITI 
Board and is overseen by the global civil society group ‘Publish What You Pay’, whose 
campaigning had a large part in its inception. 
However, the EITI is voluntary, it currently has 51 implementing member countries144 
with many countries still yet to be assessed against the newer 2016 standard. While membership 
to the EITI improves global reputation and indicates a commitment to fight corruption, the 
unbinding nature makes implementation difficult. The voluntary aspect means that the initiative 
has a limited scope to enforce compliance from its members, easily allowing the EITI to be 
undermined by governments and other stakeholders. Nevertheless, using a multi-stakeholder 
governance is unique and proves to be “useful in addressing the divide between the state and 
society, the state and the private sector, and the private sector and society.”145 With trust and 
legitimacy in governmental structures and authority declining in many African states, especially 
in the DRC, a multi-stakeholder approach could be a solution to alleviate this and restore 
confidence as it gives civil society a greater voice.  
Standardization 
 
Another instrument developed by the international community is standardization of 
governments, companies and minerals, intended to remove conflict from the extraction of 
minerals. The ‘Conflict-Free Gold Standard’ which was published in 2012, is a prime example 
of this in the world of mineral resource management. Similar to the EITI initiative, the Gold 
Standard promotes transparency within the gold industry and indicates ethical sourcing of the 
materials to the worldwide consumers. It is designed to be implemented by the members of the 
World Gold Council via a unified approach, and in harmony with other initiatives. Its primary 
                                                 
144 Eiti.org. (2018). EITI Countries. 
145 SAIIA (2018). The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative and Africa's Mineral 
Governance Regime. Occasional Paper 266. Pp.13 
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aim is to “provide assurance that their gold has been extracted in a manner that does not cause, 
support or benefit unlawful armed conflict”146 or contribute to human rights abuses, in 
accordance with the OECD Due Dilligence guidelines and UN Guiding Principles for Business 
and Human Rights. The standard is similar to certification in that companies applying this, 
informs consumers that they conform to internationally agreed regulations and aims to increase 
transparency and trust within the gold supply chain. While the standard is available to any party 
involved in the extraction of gold, member companies are expected to adhere to a demanding set 
of practices147 as well as report publicly on their conformance. It was developed by leading gold 
miners, refiners, governments members of the supply chain, and unlike the Dodd-Frack 
legislation, included African involvement. However, they have faced difficulty in the industry as 
once gold is delivered to a refinery, it is often mixed with gold from all over making it challenging 
to trace. This complexity, in conjunction with the fact that gold is highly valued for small 
quantities, makes it susceptible to smuggling. 
Certification 
 
The use of a certification scheme in the governance of natural resources is not a new 
phenomenon. Certifying products and creating a system makes it easy to translate to consumers 
that the products they purchase are free from conflict and that employees are paid a fair wage. In 
terms of certifying mineral-based resources, the most prominent and successful endeavour was 
for the ‘blood diamond’ campaign in which saw the creation of the Kimberley Process 
Certification Scheme (KPCS) in 2003. It was applauded as the “first and most developed state-
based commodity tracking system that directly addresses the link between natural resources and 
civil wars”148 underpinned by the UN mandate and backed by leading civil society organisations, 
which enabled it to be discussed in the agenda of the 55th session of the UN General Assembly. 
                                                 
146World Gold Council (2012). Conflict-Free Gold Standard. Pp.2 
147Ibid. Pp.3 
148The World Bank (2018). Ian Bannon & Paul Collier, Natural Resources and Conflict: What 
We Can Do, in Natural Resources and violent Conflict: Options and Actions. The International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Pp.112 
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The Kimberley Process is a traceability scheme set up to limit the flow and trade of conflict 
diamonds, in conjunction with governments, industry specialists and civil society. It is a quasi-
legal binding import-export certification scheme which imposes a set of extensive requirements 
on its 81-member countries to enable them to certify shipments of rough diamonds as ‘conflict 
free’. Under the terms of the process, participating members must enact national legislation to 
apply the scheme, commit to information and data transparency and exchange, as well as meet 
the minimum set of requirements so their international exports of rough diamonds can be 
accompanied by a KP certificate. The participants of the KP can only trade with other 
participants, and implementation is overseen by Australia, who is currently the chair. 
The story of conflict diamonds is similar to that of conflict minerals and therefore, 
implementing a certification system similar to the KPCS, has been a topic widely discussed when 
strategizing on how to tackle the emerging issue. Taking the lessons and flaws learnt from KPCS, 
the narrow definitions of certification may dramatically curb the production in minerals and 
instead allow broader issues such as worker exploitation and forced migration to continue 
occurring. Additionally, reports by British NGO, Global Witness have characterised the KPCS 
as providing a “convenient smokescreen”149 for diamond smuggling and for atrocities to 
continue. The scheme allegedly authorised exports from two companies operating in Zimbabwe 
in 2009, which was rumoured to kill around 200 miners in the process, causing the organization 
to resign as an official observer in 2011150. The system has also faced difficulty within 
enforcement as creating a credible third-party organisation to oversee all the components of a 
fair-trade system and to verify worker conditions and wages has proven to be challenging. 
Furthermore, the KPCS has faced criticisms in that it overlooks the role of the states involved in 
the trade as it mainly focuses on non-state actor abuses. It assumes that ending the conflict is 
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sufficient enough, but does little to regulate how and what undemocratic or repressive 
governments do with such resources. 
Traceability Schemes – Tag and bag, track and trace, finger printing. 
ITRI Tin Supply Chain Initiative (iTSCi) 
Mineral mining is a very informal trade and its journey from mine to being utilised in a 
final product has a number of varying components to it, making criminalisation of the trade 
evitable. Subsequently, this has encouraged many governments, companies and civil society 
organisations to reassess the current strategies to formalising the industry in DRC and refocus 
their energy on projects tackling the supply chain. The International Tin Association, formerly 
the ITRI, pursued this approach in 2009 developing the ITRI Tin Supply Chain Initiative (iTSCi). 
The scheme is the tin industry’s traceability and due diligence programme, aiming to avoid 
financing armed conflict in the region from extraction of the 3Ts. The program uses three step 
approach of overseeing the supply chain. Firstly, they trace the origins of the minerals and chain 
of custody thereafter, secondly they conduct an “independent third party risk assessment of mine 
sites, transportation routes, companies and the macrolevel situation to identify and manage 
conflict-related risks”151, and lastly independent audits involving international and domestic 
companies who have joined the scheme, and often the mines themselves.  
Yet in practice, the iTSCi has faced challenges due to its geographical and logistical 
difficulties when dealing with secluded mining sites, limited funding and inadequacy of local 
infrastructure152. Additionally, as the programme is upstream orientated, it does not help or 
benefit local ASM miners, leaving them with no other option other than accept an unfair price 
for their goods, or resort to smuggling.  
 
                                                 
151  United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (2013). Special report on the “The 
ICGLR Regional Initiative against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources (RINR) and 
other Certification Mechanisms in the Great Lakes Region: Lessons Learned and Best 
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152 Ibid. Pp.34 
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BGR’s Certified Trading Chains (CTC) 
Seeking to fill the void that other 3TG certification systems missed, the German Federal 
Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources (BGR) established the Certified Trading Chains 
(CTC) scheme in 2008. They attempted to curate a scheme that works with mineral-rich 
governments and incorporates broader social, environmental and labour specific issues that many 
programs previously overlooked. Its main objective is to “certify responsible mining practice or 
ethical production and trade of minerals,”153 emphasising process in the ASM capacity, focusing 
on five core principles: 
1. Traceability & Transparency 
2. Labour and Working Conditions 
3. Security 
4. Community Development 
5. Environmental Protection 
The CTC program seeks to ensure that information on mineral origins, quantities and 
payments to governments are openly available supporting the OECD Due Diligence Guidelines 
mentioned above. It was first piloted in Rwanda during 2009-2011 and extended to the DRC in 
2009-2016,154 working closely with national authorities in both countries as well as the ICGLR. 
The BGR have also been working on an analytical fingerprint (AFP) technology since 2006, 
which will provide the means for determining mineral ore origin of the 3Ts. While this cannot 
be used as a stand-alone mineral traceability system, it “serves to verify the integrity, and thus 
credibility”155 of tagging.  
Conflict-Free Smelter Program (CFS) 
Another industry driven program was developed in 2009 by members of the Responsible 
Business Alliance (RBA), formerly known as the Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition 
(EICC), and the Global e-Sustainability Initiative (GeSI). They intended to implement the 
Conflict-Free Smelter Program (CFS) and ensure compliance at the smelting and refining stage 
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154 Ibid. 
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of the mineral supply chain. This part of the chain is crucial, as it is the point at which the ores 
are all compiled and mixed with others mined all over the country, making the mineral origins 
indistinguishable thereafter. Furthermore, it is the first point after extraction where there are 
relatively few actors, enabling better oversight and regulation. Due to the development of other 
mineral governance frameworks following its implementation, the CFS program was 
restructured in 2017 to be more aligned with international standards such as the OECD. It was 
also renamed to ‘the Responsible Minerals Assurance Process’ (RMAP) and the changes are due 
to come into effects on 1 June 2018156. The organization validates conformance of smelters and 
refiners via an independent third-party audit, ensuring that they meet the RMAP requirements. 
Currently “more than 360 companies from seven different industries participate in the RMI 
today,”157 with the RMI publishing a list of approved smelters and refiners online, as well as 
providing freely available information and training tools for those wishing to become RMAP 
compliant.  
Summary  
Since the birth of the conflict mineral campaign and increasing international pressure to 
mediate, there have been numerous projects developed to tackle the governance of natural 
resources, as demonstrated above. Having evaluated a few of the key initiatives and legal 
mechanisms that have arisen locally, regionally and internationally, it is clear that the industry 
and global market is ready to accept some responsibility. As I have explored in this section, many 
stakeholders of the Congolese mineral supply chain are working on strategies to reduce ASM’s 
relationship to conflict in DRC, which they feel they have perpetuated due to previous 
negligence. 
With the rise of foreign accountability and calls for more ethical business practices 
abroad, the international community has done a good job of raising awareness and rallying 
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together in attempts to help the plight of Congolese creuseurs. While a strong legal framework 
to govern natural resources in DRC is greatly needed, the international laws developed thus far, 
however, have seemingly fallen short. While developed with sound objectives, the Dodd-Frank 
and OECD guidelines are examples of premature international mediation, that misinterpreted the 
nature of the conflict in the DRC and failed to grasp the potential wider implications before 
coming into effect. Additionally, these policies were largely created without the involvement of 
the very people it was intended to protect, making the de facto embargo that resulted from the 
law extremely detrimental to the people of eastern DRC who relied on mining as their source of 
income. While local mining projects and attempts at formalisation have been ongoing in the DRC 
since ASM became such a key part of the country’s livelihood, these strategies have not been 
well designed or implemented, as it is missing the realities of the trade and voice of civil society. 
The intercontinental legal mechanisms that were designed to negate this, instead hindered local 
progress as companies began withdrawing their operations in the Congo, sourcing their minerals 
elsewhere, proving that a mechanism to formalise the industry and disincentivise criminality was 
required. 
Certification, standardization and other traceability schemes devised by the industry and 
companies in due diligence efforts, attempted to do just this; filling the gap that legal mechanisms 
could not address. Seeking to create a system by which companies could prove that the minerals 
they use are sourced ethically without any armed actor involvement, the various industries 
embarked on various attempts at formalising and monitoring the mineral trade in Congo. While 
they seem great on paper, in reality they have been seemingly difficult to separate from the 
criminalization of the sector. In some cases, particularly in sites where there is little authoritative 
oversight, these strategies have had the adverse effect, creating a smokescreen for illicit practices 
and making smuggling more attractive. There is a strong possibility that even if a mineral is 
certified conflict free, armed groups may still profit form it as bribery and extortion continue to 
transpire. Furthermore, the unbinding and ostensible voluntary nature of most of these initiatives 
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makes enforcement difficult, as it solely relies on a company’s good faith and fear of a tarnished 
global reputation as punishment for non-compliance.  
All the projects evaluated above, aim to tackle the various challenges posed by the 
informal ASM sector, but it is evident that they lack interaction and connectivity amongst 
themselves. It is encouraging seeing the sheer volume of organisations and intergovernmental 
agencies that have arisen from the topic, yet a stronger harmonisation between the various 
initiatives is required. Local voices and civil society engagement has been somewhat included, 
but the attempts at governance are still very fractured. Most of the above approaches have been 
initiated by a top-down strategy, yet there is a need to finance and provide resources to smaller 
NGO’s and support ASM civil society groups, encouraging a more bottom-up approach. Only 
these local workers will really know the lay of the land, and given the right support, will have 
the potential to design and implement projects site-specific and more effectively. A dominant 
challenge to this and facing formalisation of the mineral trade, is a lack of political and 
institutional capacity. State weakness and absence of strong authority severely hinders the 
formalisation process, as it facilitates criminalisation and permits too many loopholes. Corruption 
amongst those in power, again perpetuates this, leading to a distrust in authority and disregard 
for the rule of law. When analysing the many programs implemented for better mineral 
governance in Congo, the complicated, informal nature of ASM makes it is clear that a stronger 
and more unified local, regional, international alliance is required, paired with state-building 
programs. Isolated attempts to formalise the DRC mineral industry, without local authority or 
civil society involvement is futile and as illustrated will make it difficult to achieve the desired 
outcome. 
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Conclusion 
The conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as examined in this thesis, has 
proven to be a very nuanced and complex affair. It has persevered through several decades, 
manipulated by various leaderships and undergone numerous shifts to those involved and its very 
core. Contrary to popular belief and western advocacy efforts, it can be now determined that 
while Congo’s mineral wealth once had a role in the instability, it does not currently lie at the 
heart of the ongoing violence. The natural resource came to importance during Congo’s second 
war, which was driven by political motivations, but the guise of insecurity enabled rebels to 
maintain control and profit. Yet, despite transitioning from a war-riddled country towards peace 
and democracy, instability in the region still persists. This leads me back to my original research 
question; why is it that despite all the international, regional and domestic measures that have 
arisen to tackle the informalisation of DRC’s mineral trade, illicit extraction and armed actor 
involvement is still apparent throughout the industry? As my research has presented, there is no 
singular answer. But I have uncovered an array of overarching weaknesses and limitations to 
those initiatives already in place, which has hindered its overall effectiveness on the ground. 
The first of which, has to do with the mislabelling of the fundamental cause of the 
instability in the DRC. The “politics of natural resources were once determined by corporations 
seeking profits and governments seeking taxes,”158 but this has now transitioned into an 
international approach via an ethically driven framework. We have the shift in collective 
consciousness and refocusing of ideology, to highlight the importance of human rights issues and 
strong resource governance to thank for this increased attention on the Congo. While advocacy 
efforts compiled by The Enough Project and Global Witness were effective in bringing the 
mining issue in Congo to centre attention, they have been somewhat misleading and one-sided 
in their approach. Having focused solely on the negative side of artisanal mining, has given policy 
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makers and the global audience an incomplete picture of the real problem in the DRC and why 
conflict ensues. Many years after the formal end of Congo’s war, violence and conflict is still 
prevalent. The international narrative generally disregards the pockets of local hostilities due to 
ethnic conflicts, land disputes and issues with jurisdiction, which have been a key source of 
instability for many years. These local cleavages when left unaddressed have had the capacity to 
develop into regional warfare, and continuing to neglect them will only allow them to fester and 
disrupt any future peacebuilding efforts. This case causes us to revaluate the role of global 
activism in pushing for policy change, as the consequential legal mechanisms and industry driven 
programs developed, negatively impacted the very people it wished to protect. 
Secondly, with the nuanced and multifaceted nature of the conflict in the DRC, it is now 
understood that local voices were largely left out of the debate, as international actors took it 
upon themselves to generate a solution. The vast majority of international and regional 
approaches to formalising ASM have been developed with little to no input from the Congolese 
community, which has caused them to have optimistic expectations on their adoption and 
typically miss the realities of the trade. This can be especially seen with the creation and 
implementation of America’s Dodd-Frank Law, which in hindsight has proven to be prematurely 
executed without fully comprehending all the potential effects on DRC. The legislation is widely 
criticised for its limited definition, unbinding nature and there is still a question of accountability, 
as the only punishment for noncompliance is a tarnished company reputation. The tedious rules 
on companies and leniency of the law, caused many of them to simply source their minerals 
elsewhere creating a de facto boycott, which had severe consequences for the ill prepared 
creseurs, pushing the trade deeper underground.  
Furthermore, what is truly overwhelming when we look at the various strategies 
implemented to tackle the formalization of Congo’s mining sector, is that the majority of them 
are top-down approaches. These strategies have been moulded by governments; national, 
regional, international; mining conglomerates; international electronic, technology companies; 
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each with their own political agenda and set of stakeholders to answer to. This places them in a 
constant conflict of interest, as in pursuing their own individual desires, the needs of the miners 
and local mining communities for them are secondary. Therefore, the problem becomes not one 
of “the unwillingness of the miners, but rather the inappropriateness of the policy measures to 
their situations,”159 which can only be rectified if they are included in strategy development. The 
existing regulations are condemned for being too narrow and technical, overlooking the broader 
issues and providing very little incentives for miners and traders to join the formalisation project. 
There is a complex web of socio-economic and political issues at the heart of Congo’s natural 
resource sector and hence it is clear that an “externally imposed formalization process will not 
work.”160 Nevertheless, due to the interconnectedness of Congo’s mineral industry, resource 
governance cannot be left as a single state problem. As this paper has highlighted, Congo’s 
neighbours are very much involved and complicit in the illegal smuggling of minerals. Hence, a 
unified and streamlined regional response is required, with the cooperation and commitment of 
the surrounding nations. 
While a holistic and harmonised international, regional and domestic approach is required 
for effective resource management in the DRC, there are still internal struggles which left 
unconfronted will greatly obstruct their relevant success. The biggest barrier to Congo’s ASM 
formalisation and other supply chain initiatives, is its own state weakness and inadequacy of its 
infrastructure. The absence of a strong state authority and rule of law, has stemmed from 
Mobutu’s reign, who over the years redirected the state’s resources away from public 
establishments towards his personal enrichment. His leadership encouraged and fostered an air 
of corruption, which seeped into many of the structures of governance and has remained there 
ever since. In the most recent corruptions perceptions rankings, the DRC scored a mere 21, 
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ranking 161st worldwide161. This has greatly impacted the mindset of current ruling elites and 
also the political agendas pursued, as those with affiliations to natural resource companies, due 
to the potential for high rewards, will have strong incentives to govern in a manner benefitting 
themselves. Despite transitioning towards democracy, there is little state accountability, which 
hampers the progress of the many initiatives to stop armed actor involvement in mineral 
extraction. As stated by Cuvelier et al162, the illegal natural resource exploitation are generally 
by-products of frail establishments, which is apparent for the case of Congo, enabling the 
industry to succumb to militarisation. The ineffective governance has kept the economy weak, 
vulnerable to external shocks and is its greatest barrier to growth and stability. 
The purpose of this study set out to make a theoretical contribution to the studies of the 
resource curse. What I have uncovered while examining the situation in the Congo is that the 
curse is in fact originating from localised cleavages and aggravations, rather than the abundance 
of the minerals themselves; a resource curse from below. Friction between varying ethnic groups 
and clashes between chiefs for land rights are the key factors maintaining a level of violence in 
the DRC. While the international, regional and domestic strategies to formalise the mineral trade 
must be coherent and coordinated, they must first ensure that the climate of the DRC is stable to 
guarantee their longevity. Until these grassroot disagreements are given priority and are able to 
reach an understanding, peace cannot be expected to be achieved or sustained in the Congo. 
 
Recommendations 
 
One of the big lessons learned from all these individual initiatives is that “the linkages 
between natural resources, conflict and wider governance and human rights issues should be 
addressed simultaneously for a better impact and outcome”. The fragmentation of the various 
initiatives in nature and applicability is evidence that a uniform strategy is required. Attempting 
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to tackle all the issues separately will not be as effective, as they all remain interlinked and rely 
on one another for successfulness. The various strategies currently in place to govern Congo’s 
mineral wealth have largely been developed independently by international actors and industry 
experts, without liaising with local specialists. They have not been as effective as required due 
to poor infrastructure, lack of state capacity and political will. Drawing from the limitations to 
existing approaches as uncovered by my research, this section aims to present some 
recommendations for current initiatives and advice aiming to enable the DRC to be more 
receptive to future endeavours on natural resource governance. 
 
Local  
Strengthen Governmental Structures  
First and foremost, it is clear that the fragile institutional capacity of Congo’s government 
is a great impediment to any strategy seeking to be operational in the nation. There should be 
increased emphasis placed on re-establishing trust in Congo’s governance, strengthening the 
current governing bodies and rule of law, with protocols in place to hold those in power 
accountable. Policies and regulations are more likely to be adhered to and followed, when 
members of the public have confidence that their leaders are acting in their best interest. This 
could be achieved by demilitarisation of mining sites, as well as increasing governmental and 
bureaucratic transparency, which is likely to restore faith in political establishments. State leaders 
and governing elites should also seek to gain trust and respect from their constituents, which 
could be achieved by declaring or passing laws requiring them to relinquishing their affiliations 
to the mining sector, demonstrating that there are no longer ulterior motives in policy discussions.  
The present institutions in the DRC are not equipped to handle and enforce the law 
effectively throughout the entire country, therefore smaller branches of authority predominantly 
scattered throughout mining areas would be beneficial in restoring order and discouraging illicit 
trading of minerals. In order for these to be respected and effective, corruptive practices such as 
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bribes should be closely monitored and punished. Reliable and trustworthy groups of authority 
with high regard for the rule of law, should be positioned along key trade routes and along the 
border to deter any smuggling or rebel involvement in mining activities.  
Address root causes of instability  
The Congolese government should also divert resources to understanding and remedying 
the underlying causes of instability, which has historically been overlooked. Establishing 
provincial organisations or working with local NGO’s to promote community engagement and 
peacebuilding campaigns to alleviate ethnic tensions, especially between the Banyarwanda and 
Hunde groups, could be one way to lower hostilities in the local environment. Additionally, land 
rights and territorial distinctions should be carefully examined and appropriated in conjunction 
with local chiefs and settlements. Land is extremely valuable and important in Congo, and 
therefore it should be delicately negotiated and divided, as to avoid future disagreements. 
Empower Miners 
ASM is a highly vulnerable trade and therefore, there is a need for more miner protections 
and safeguards to be implemented. As Greenen notes, “formalization risks to confirm and 
reinforce the rights of the stronger parties”163, which stresses the need for unionization of the 
miners themselves in order to collectively defend their own rights, bargain for policy changes 
and have representation in policy discussions. Information sharing and granting free access to 
daily mineral prices and mineral ore content will help miners from being taken advantage of and 
should guarantee that they receive fair prices for their commodities.  
Revaluate and implement strategies with local input  
In the context of mining regulation, Kabila’s administration should revise the mining 
codes to reflect the evolving realities. As aforementioned, the authorities should create more ZEA 
mining zones and form multiple smaller branches of the relevant bodies closer to the mineral 
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deposits, regulating the informal and unauthorised sites, as well as making it easier for miners to 
obtain required permits and information. This would help establish some support to the local 
creuseurs and allows state oversight which should protect miners from environmental dangers 
and deter child labour. To tackle child labour, the state has an obligation to make education free, 
compulsory and easily accessible, which will limit the volume of children available to mine. 
Moreover, there should be investment made in developing other alternative livelihood methods, 
to avoid overmining, economic dependency on its natural resource and offer diversification. 
A strong foundation, increased faith and respect in governing institutions are the 
minimum requirements in the local context for any further policies to be effective. While regional 
and international mediation in ASM could be advantageous, domestic and local capacity needs 
to first be expanded, intensified and supported. 
Regional  
Harmonisation of laws and creation of a regional oversight committee 
The mineral market and trade is not confined just to the DRC, as the porous borders 
allows many of the surrounding nations to actively participate and profit from the sale of Congo’s 
resources. This is why in order to be effectual, the “multifaceted crisis in the DRC requires 
coordination within the region”164. Harmonisation of the laws and stipulations across the great 
lakes region is pivotal for governing success, as it makes it clear that the countries involved are 
all committed to stopping illegal trade and are responsible to enforce the appropriate measures 
within their own borders. An alliance and streamlined approach, makes coordination easier and 
should be reinforced with a regional oversight committee separate from each nation’s 
government, which can facilitate intercontinental dialogue, synchronisation, evaluate and hold 
accountable each member’s strategy implementation. 
International 
Support Congo’s governing structures 
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While restructuring and strengthening Congo’s public institutions are a domestic issue, 
international pressure could be strategically placed on Congo’s current governing elites to 
execute these. International organisations and donors need to be more aware and responsible for 
their donations and how it impacts the Congo state. They need ensure that strategies do not make 
the country reliant on their aid and encourage the state to put its citizens above political and 
personal motivations. A possible method of ensuring this could be to make political aid 
contingent on political reforms, with regular outside audits on fulfilment. Donor institutions 
could also use their influence to help more legitimate and responsible leaders rise to the top and 
be trusted to take control of state resources for greater good.  
Collaborate with local NGO’s and grassroots organisations to develop enforceable 
traceability mechanisms 
The international community and various industries with operations in the DRC have 
been very effective in assuming responsibility on their practices abroad. They have adopted 
strategies that holds them morally, political and legally accountable and have sought to develop 
ways in which their activities can be ethically conducted. In response to this, there has been 
increased focus on establishing supply-side due diligence and tracing schemes for the 3TGs, yet 
they have been mainly conducted without the input of local knowledge. As a result, the laws and 
various formalising initiatives have generally followed a top-down approach and failed at cutting 
off armed involvement, subjecting the nation to an array of unintended negative consequences. 
From my research, it seems evident that these foreign projects would benefit from collaborating 
with local NGO’s and grassroots organisations to create more bottom-up management schemes. 
Partnering with local specialists not only would benefit the local economy, but it would also 
allow global actors to gain valuable insight into the truths of the trade, generating a more targeted 
operational response.  
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Evaluate and reorient current legislations and initiatives 
The current legislations and initiatives are widely criticised for being too narrow which 
has impacted its overall value. While there are current talks of amendments and repeals to these, 
the laws are limited in its application and scope. Since Dodd Frank’s creation, the importance of 
cobalt has risen dramatically and hence there is a need for it to be included as a conflict mineral. 
Furthermore, the due diligence mechanisms are nonbinding and based mainly on the company’s 
fear of receiving a tainted status. This in itself is not enough to influence businesses into action 
and to drastically change or alter their operations towards a more ethical framework. There is a 
need for credible sanctions and financial punishments for non-compliance, which will create 
incentives for following the rules. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
The issue of conflict minerals is multidimensional and highly intricate and therefore, a 
nuanced approach is best required to alleviate some of the local struggles. Due to the multiple 
interacting factors and actors, a multi-stakeholder approach and a process that engages 
surrounding governments, industry, civil society and the international bodies such as the UN is 
strongly required. With the huge advancement of technological development over the last few 
years, the exponential rise in demand for electric cars and the growth in demand for ethically 
sourced products, it is clear that Congo’s mining industry is only going to grow in its importance. 
It is therefore imperative that policy makers acknowledge the complexity surrounding Congo’s 
ASM and work to include equal representation of all relevant parties in future strategy 
development. Congo’s mineral wealth can and should be harnessed for the good of the nation, 
not treated like a curse. 
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